Allan Bäck

Paul Spade has always been a prolific and accurate translator of medieval texts. Here he provides the service of translating some important medieval texts on the problem of universals: the Isagoge by Porphyry, and selections from Boethius's second commentary on the Isagoge, from the Glosses on the Isagoge by Abelard, from the Ordinatio of Scotus, and from the Ordinatio of Ockham. Spade provides some helpful notes, an introduction, and glossary, although I find this material somewhat sparse. A nonspecialist would find more explanation helpful. As Spade himself notes, the texts are difficult. Given the breadth of Spade's scholarship and erudition, I think that he should not be so diffident in offering more extensive comments.

I give an analysis of the logical structure of statements describing duties in social roles. Role terms like ‘doctor’ should not be treated as simple predicates, as natural kind terms, like ‘human being’, are. When role terms are treated as simple predicates, fallacies may result. Rather, treat role terms (M) as complex predicates with a simple subject, a person (S), as a base; ‘S qua M’, and then analyze their reduplicative structure. I illustrate and support this analysis by considering sophisms, traditionally known as committing the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter, about conflicts of duties in different roles. I end with some remarks about personal integrity.

This book offers a translation of two short commentaries by John Duns Scotus on Aristotle’s On Interpretation. It comes with an introduction, notes, and a commentary. I think that this book would be difficult for a novice; perhaps the intended audience is someone with a general familiarity with medieval philosophy, although not necessarily with medieval logic. I do not think that someone just interested in general logical issues, such as existential import or future contingents, will find much to interest her here, despite some remarks in the commentary.In the introduction, Buckner and Zupko discuss these commentaries and their place in Scotus’s corpus. It seems that they were written by Scotus himself..

Al comparar la visión de Avicena y Kant sobre la imaginación, encontramos una sorprendente congruencia en sus doctrinas. Las doctrinas de Kant sobre la síntesis de la imaginación en su Deducción Trascendental tiene notables similitudes con la visión de Avicena. Tanto para Avicena como para Kant, la imaginación sirve para conectar lo fenoménico con lo nouménico. Al menos esta comparación tiene el doble uso de colocar las doctrinas de Kant en el contexto de la tradición aristotélica y de iluminar la importancia moderna que tiene el pensamiento de Avicena. Dado que el pensamiento de Kant nos es más familiar que el de Avicena, podemos usar a Kant también para ayudar a comprender las tesis de Avicena. Por otro lado, esta comparación puede ayudar a sostener la tesis de que la comprensión de Kant yace en gran medida en sus raíces medievales y post-medievales —tal como ocurre con Copérnico, que, en su propia “Revolución Copernicana”, seguía ciertas tradiciones anteriores.

I give an analysis of the logical structure of statements describing duties in social roles. Role terms like ‘doctor’ should not be treated as simple predicates, as natural kind terms, like ‘human being’, are. When role terms are treated as simple predicates, fallacies may result. Rather, treat role terms (M) as complex predicates with a simple subject, a person (S), as a base; ‘S qua M’, and then analyze their reduplicative structure. I illustrate and support this analysis by considering sophisms, traditionally known as committing the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter, about conflicts of duties in different roles. I end with some remarks about personal integrity.

Jean-Baptiste Rauzy writes here on Leibniz’s theory of truth, construed broadly, mostly in Leibniz’s earlier periods. He focuses mostly on Leibniz’s logical theory, particularly as given in the logical papers, published only with Couturat and others, in 1901 and following. Unlike a lot of the secondary literature, Rauzy’s book gives much detail about how Leibniz’s various logical models work out and apply to more general issues such as the reduction of relations, the ontological square, haecceity, and the problem of universals.

This volume forms part of the translation series, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, with Richard Sorabji as General Editor. This series consists of English translations of parts of the Commentaria in Aristotelis Graeca. Like its companion volumes, the translation includes an introduction, the series introduction, and indices, including one from Greek to the English translations used. The book is well-produced with few typos, although I wonder a bit at not using the Greek font instead of Romanizing it.

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship