•  785
    Papineau on Sensory Experience
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 3 308-17. 2023.
    Comment on David Papineau's _The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience_.
  •  3904
    Hallucination and Its Objects
    Philosophical Review 131 (3): 327-359. 2022.
    When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each have problems. This paper defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.
  •  4551
    Perception and Probability
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2): 343-363. 2021.
  •  577
    Appendix to "The female of the species: reply to Heartsilver"
    Journal of Controversial Ideas 2 (1). 2022.
    More discussion of some issues raised in "The female of the species: reply to Heartsilver", Journal of Controversial Ideas 2: 1-22 (2022)
  •  641
    The female of the species: reply to Heartsilver
    Journal of Controversial Ideas 2 (1-22). 2022.
    Maggie Heartsilver’s “Deflating Byrne’s ‘Are women adult human females?’” subjects the arguments and conclusion of “Are women...?” to a probing and comprehensive stress ­test. The present paper responds to Heartsilver’s objections, and also discusses the significance of the proposition that trans women are women.
  •  740
    Smithies’s Mentalism and E=K
    Analysis 81 (4): 774-782. 2022.
    Comment on Declan Smithies's book The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019).
  •  150
    Readings on Color I: The Philosophy of Color (edited book)
    with David R. Hilbert
    MIT Press. 1997.
    Edward Wilson Averill By the phrase 'anthropocentric account of color' I mean an account of color that makes an assumption of the following form: two...
  •  791
    Knowing By Perceiving, by Alan Millar
    Mind 132 (527): 852-861. 2021.
    Millar has written a valuable monograph on perceptual knowledge. Knowing By Perceiving is careful and detailed, at times laborious, delivering many insights. Oc.
  •  2251
    How do things look to the color-blind?
    In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science, Bradford. pp. 259. 2010.
    Color-vision defects constitute a spectrum of disorders with varying degrees and types of departure from normal human color vision. One form of color-vision defect is dichromacy; by mixing together only two lights, the dichromat can match any light, unlike normal trichromatic humans, who need to mix three. In a philosophical context, our titular question may be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken at face value as a question about visible properties of external objects, and second, it may b…Read more
  •  956
    David Rosenthal couples his higher-order thought theory of consciousness with a theory of “mental qualities”, properties of mental states. The first thesis of this paper is that there are no mental qualities as Rosenthal conceives of them. The second thesis is that Rosenthal’s residual insights are significant. They naturally lead to a simple first-order theory of consciousness.
  •  120
    Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honor of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replie…Read more
  •  218
    Gender identity is ill-suited as a basis for non-discrimination protections, as proposed in the 2019 Equality Act. Biological sex provides a clearer and better means to the same laudable end.
  •  1267
    Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content
    Philosophical Studies 178 (9): 3017-3026. 2020.
    This comment mainly examines Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s preferred framework for examining whether narrow content is viable, arguing that their framework is not well-suited to the task; once a more traditional framework is adopted, Y&H’s case against internalism is strengthened.
  •  8302
    Gender muddle: reply to Dembroff
    Journal of Controversial Ideas 1 (1). 2021.
    Dembroff’s “Escaping the natural attitude about gender” replies to my “Are women adult human females?”. This paper responds to Dembroff’s many criticisms of my arguments, as well as to the charge that “Are women...” “fundamentally is an unscholarly attempt to vindicate a political slogan that is currently being used to undermine civic rights and respect for trans persons”. I argue that Dembroff’s criticisms fail without exception, and explain why the claims about my motives are baseless.
  •  2591
    Concepts, Belief, and Perception
    In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Perception, Routledge. 2020.
    At least in one well-motivated sense of ‘concept’, all perception involves concepts, even perception as practiced by lizards and bees. That is because—the paper argues—all perception involves belief.
  •  28834
    Are women adult human females?
    Philosophical Studies 177 (12): 3783-3803. 2020.
    Are women (simply) adult human females? Dictionaries suggest that they are. However, philosophers who have explicitly considered the question invariably answer no. This paper argues that they are wrong. The orthodox view is that the category *woman* is a social category, like the categories *widow* and *police officer*, although exactly what this social category consists in is a matter of considerable disagreement. In any event, orthodoxy has it that *woman* is definitely not a biological catego…Read more
  •  1311
    Review of Perception and Its Objects (OUP 2011), by Bill Brewer.
  •  969
    Schellenberg’s Capacitism
    Analysis 79 (4): 713-19. 2019.
    The Unity of Perception offers a grand synoptic vision of how perception, consciousness and knowledge fit together. It is a remarkable achievement. A short comment can only address fragments of Schellenberg’s picture; naturally I will look for weak spots.
  •  3186
    The science of color and color vision
    In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Routledge. 2017.
    A survey of color science and color vision.
  •  1712
    Objectivist reductionism
    In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Routledge. 2017.
    A survey of arguments for and against the view that colors are physical properties.
  •  1395
    Color relationalism and relativism
    Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1): 172-192. 2017.
    This paper critically examines color relationalism and color relativism, two theories of color that are allegedly supported by variation in normal human color vision. We mostly discuss color relationalism, defended at length in Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real, and argue that the theory has insuperable problems.
  •  252
    Hoffman’s “proof” of the possibility of spectrum inversion
    with David Hilbert
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1): 48-50. 2006.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple math…Read more
  •  1000
    What is gender identity?
    Arc Digital. 2019.
    The often poorly explained notion of gender identity, and the attendant cisgender/transgender distinction, are critically examined.
  •  581
    Is sex socially constructed?
    Arc Digital. 2018.
    Three arguments for the thesis that sex is socially constructed are examined and rejected. No such argument could succeed, because sex is not socially constructed.
  •  129
    On Denoting
    with Alex Byrne and Michael Thau
    Mind 14 (56): 479-493. 1905.
    Richard Heck, in "The Sense of Communication" (Mind, 104, pp. 79-106, 1995), argues against the "Hybrid View"--the claim, roughly, that names are Millian while beliefs are Fregean. We argue that Heck's argument fails.
  •  1589
    Perception and ordinary objects
    In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects, Cambridge University Press. 2018.
    The paper argues -- against the standard view in metaphysics -- that the existence of ordinary objects like tomatoes is (near-enough) established by the fact that such things are apparently encountered in perception.
  •  758
    Is sex binary?
    Arc Digital. 2018.
    Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling's New York Times Op-Ed, in which she purports to explain why sex isn't binary.
  •  359
    "This admirable volume of readings is the first of a pair: the editors are to be applauded for placing the philosophy of color exactly where it should go, in...