•  178
    Intentionalism Defended
    Philosophical Review 110 (2): 199-240. 2001.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentiona…Read more
  •  792
    Recollection, perception, imagination
    Philosophical Studies 148. 2010.
    Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. The paper addresses two questions: Q1. What are these similarities (and differences)? Q2. How does one tell that one is recalling (and so not perceiving or imagining)?
  •  329
    Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain
    Philosophical Studies 161 489-96. 2012.
    Critical discussion of Chris Hill's perceptual theory of pain.