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339Hmm… Hill on the paradox of painPhilosophical Studies 161 489-96. 2012.Critical discussion of Chris Hill's perceptual theory of pain.
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30Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of PerceptionPhilosophical Review 108 (3): 415. 1999.Problems of Vision is divided into three parts. The first part argues for the “insight at [the] core” of the causal theory of perception.
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1759Rich or thin?In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2016.Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
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36Dennett versus GibsonBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 751-752. 1998.Pessoa et al. misinterpret some of Dennett's discussion of filling-in. Their argument against the representational conception of vision and for a Gibsonian alternative is also flawed.
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121It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon
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82<b>1</b>. Let us say that a thought is _about an object _o just in case the truth value of the thought at any possible world W depends on how things are with _o_ in W. Thus the thought that the first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist is not about Bismark, because that thought is true in a world W iff, in W, whoever happens to be the first Chancellor was an astute diplomatist, and that may well not be Bismark. On Russell.
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495Perception and conceptual contentIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 231--250. 2013.Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is…Read more
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763Sensory qualities, sensible qualities, sensational qualitiesIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.Philosophers of mind have distinguished (and sometimes conflated) various qualities. This article tries to sort things out.
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50Knowing right and wrong: Is morality a natural phenomenon?Boston Review. 2007.An introduction to meta-ethics for non-philosophers
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54Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience. Our target article had three aims: (a) to explain clearly the structure of the debate about color realism; (b) to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to t…Read more
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421IntrospectionPhilosophical Topics 33 (1): 79-104. 2005.I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from the…Read more