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Alex Byrne

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    166
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    17
  •  News and Updates
    63

 More details
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
    Professor
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1993
CV
Homepage
0000-0003-3652-1492
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Gender
Philosophy of Sexual Orientation
Philosophy of Sexuality
PhilPapers Editorships
Color Experience
Color
Physicalist Theories of Color
Dispositionalist Theories of Color
Primitivist Theories of Color
Theories of Color, Misc
Color Realism
Color Irrealism
Color Terms
Color, Misc
5 more
  • All publications (166)
  •  4525
    Perception and Probability
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2): 343-363. 2021.
    Degrees of BeliefUpdating PrinciplesConditionalization
  •  569
    Appendix to "The female of the species: reply to Heartsilver"
    Journal of Controversial Ideas 2 (1). 2022.
    More discussion of some issues raised in "The female of the species: reply to Heartsilver", Journal of Controversial Ideas 2: 1-22 (2022)
    Biological Conceptions of Womanhood
  •  636
    The female of the species: reply to Heartsilver
    Journal of Controversial Ideas 2 (1-22). 2022.
    Maggie Heartsilver’s “Deflating Byrne’s ‘Are women adult human females?’” subjects the arguments and conclusion of “Are women...?” to a probing and comprehensive stress ­test. The present paper responds to Heartsilver’s objections, and also discusses the significance of the proposition that trans women are women.
    Biological Conceptions of Womanhood
  •  730
    Smithies’s Mentalism and E=K
    Analysis 81 (4): 774-782. 2022.
    Comment on Declan Smithies's book The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019).
  •  148
    Readings on Color I: The Philosophy of Color (edited book)
    with David R. Hilbert
    MIT Press. 1997.
    Edward Wilson Averill By the phrase 'anthropocentric account of color' I mean an account of color that makes an assumption of the following form: two...
    PerceptionColor
  •  788
    Knowing By Perceiving, by Alan Millar
    Mind 132 (527): 852-861. 2021.
    Millar has written a valuable monograph on perceptual knowledge. Knowing By Perceiving is careful and detailed, at times laborious, delivering many insights. Oc.
  •  2228
    How do things look to the color-blind?
    with David R. Hilbert
    In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science, Bradford. pp. 259. 2010.
    Color-vision defects constitute a spectrum of disorders with varying degrees and types of departure from normal human color vision. One form of color-vision defect is dichromacy; by mixing together only two lights, the dichromat can match any light, unlike normal trichromatic humans, who need to mix three. In a philosophical context, our titular question may be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken at face value as a question about visible properties of external objects, and second, it may b…Read more
    Color-vision defects constitute a spectrum of disorders with varying degrees and types of departure from normal human color vision. One form of color-vision defect is dichromacy; by mixing together only two lights, the dichromat can match any light, unlike normal trichromatic humans, who need to mix three. In a philosophical context, our titular question may be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken at face value as a question about visible properties of external objects, and second, it may be interpreted as the more intangible question of “what it’s like” to be color-blind.
    Color ExperienceColor
  •  947
    Rosenthal on mental qualities
    In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal, Cambridge University Press. 2022.
    David Rosenthal couples his higher-order thought theory of consciousness with a theory of “mental qualities”, properties of mental states. The first thesis of this paper is that there are no mental qualities as Rosenthal conceives of them. The second thesis is that Rosenthal’s residual insights are significant. They naturally lead to a simple first-order theory of consciousness.
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  120
    Content and modality: themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker (edited book)
    with Judith Thomson
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honor of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replie…Read more
    Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honor of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed.
    Modal and Intensional LogicConditionals, Misc
  •  218
    Biological sex and the legal protection of LGBT individuals
    with Callie Burt
    Areo. 2020.
    Gender identity is ill-suited as a basis for non-discrimination protections, as proposed in the 2019 Equality Act. Biological sex provides a clearer and better means to the same laudable end.
    Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
  •  1262
    Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content
    Philosophical Studies 178 (9): 3017-3026. 2020.
    This comment mainly examines Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne’s preferred framework for examining whether narrow content is viable, arguing that their framework is not well-suited to the task; once a more traditional framework is adopted, Y&H’s case against internalism is strengthened.
    Twin Earth and Externalism
  •  8286
    Gender muddle: reply to Dembroff
    Journal of Controversial Ideas 1 (1). 2021.
    Dembroff’s “Escaping the natural attitude about gender” replies to my “Are women adult human females?”. This paper responds to Dembroff’s many criticisms of my arguments, as well as to the charge that “Are women...” “fundamentally is an unscholarly attempt to vindicate a political slogan that is currently being used to undermine civic rights and respect for trans persons”. I argue that Dembroff’s criticisms fail without exception, and explain why the claims about my motives are baseless.
    Biological Conceptions of Womanhood
  •  172
    Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience”
    with Charles Goldhaber, Anil Gupta, Adam Pautz, and T. Raja Rosenhagen
    Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 75-88. 2018.
    The Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscPerceptual Justification
  •  2569
    Concepts, Belief, and Perception
    In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Perception, Routledge. 2020.
    At least in one well-motivated sense of ‘concept’, all perception involves concepts, even perception as practiced by lizards and bees. That is because—the paper argues—all perception involves belief.
    The Nature of Perceptual ExperienceConceptsAspects of IntentionalityBeliefAspects of Perception
  •  28388
    Are women adult human females?
    Philosophical Studies 177 (12): 3783-3803. 2020.
    Are women (simply) adult human females? Dictionaries suggest that they are. However, philosophers who have explicitly considered the question invariably answer no. This paper argues that they are wrong. The orthodox view is that the category *woman* is a social category, like the categories *widow* and *police officer*, although exactly what this social category consists in is a matter of considerable disagreement. In any event, orthodoxy has it that *woman* is definitely not a biological catego…Read more
    Are women (simply) adult human females? Dictionaries suggest that they are. However, philosophers who have explicitly considered the question invariably answer no. This paper argues that they are wrong. The orthodox view is that the category *woman* is a social category, like the categories *widow* and *police officer*, although exactly what this social category consists in is a matter of considerable disagreement. In any event, orthodoxy has it that *woman* is definitely not a biological category, like the categories *amphibian* or *adult human female*. In the first part, a number of arguments are given for the view that women are adult human females; the second part turns to rebutting the main objections. Finally, a couple of morals are briefly noted: one for activist sloganeering, and one for ameliorative projects that seek to change the meaning of ‘woman’.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyBiological Conceptions of WomanhoodThe Sex/Gender Distinction
  •  1302
    Review of Brewer, Perception and Its Objects
    Mind 130 (517). 2021.
    Review of Perception and Its Objects (OUP 2011), by Bill Brewer.
  •  965
    Schellenberg’s Capacitism
    Analysis 79 (4): 713-19. 2019.
    The Unity of Perception offers a grand synoptic vision of how perception, consciousness and knowledge fit together. It is a remarkable achievement. A short comment can only address fragments of Schellenberg’s picture; naturally I will look for weak spots.
  •  3142
    The science of color and color vision
    with David R. Hilbert
    In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Routledge. 2017.
    A survey of color science and color vision.
    ColorPsychophysics
  •  1694
    Objectivist reductionism
    with David R. Hilbert
    In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Routledge. 2017.
    A survey of arguments for and against the view that colors are physical properties.
    Physicalist Theories of Color
  •  1378
    Color relationalism and relativism
    with David R. Hilbert
    Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1): 172-192. 2017.
    This paper critically examines color relationalism and color relativism, two theories of color that are allegedly supported by variation in normal human color vision. We mostly discuss color relationalism, defended at length in Jonathan Cohen's The Red and the Real, and argue that the theory has insuperable problems.
    Theories of Color, Misc
  •  250
    Hoffman’s “proof” of the possibility of spectrum inversion
    with David Hilbert
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1): 48-50. 2006.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple math…Read more
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
    The Inverted SpectrumScience of Consciousness
  •  994
    What is gender identity?
    Arc Digital. 2019.
    The often poorly explained notion of gender identity, and the attendant cisgender/transgender distinction, are critically examined.
    Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  578
    Is sex socially constructed?
    Arc Digital. 2018.
    Three arguments for the thesis that sex is socially constructed are examined and rejected. No such argument could succeed, because sex is not socially constructed.
    Properties, Misc
  •  122
    On Denoting
    with Alex Byrne and Michael Thau
    Mind 14 (56): 479-493. 1905.
    Richard Heck, in "The Sense of Communication" (Mind, 104, pp. 79-106, 1995), argues against the "Hybrid View"--the claim, roughly, that names are Millian while beliefs are Fregean. We argue that Heck's argument fails.
    Bertrand RussellSemantics
  •  1577
    Perception and ordinary objects
    In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects, Cambridge University Press. 2018.
    The paper argues -- against the standard view in metaphysics -- that the existence of ordinary objects like tomatoes is (near-enough) established by the fact that such things are apparently encountered in perception.
    Philosophy of MindDebunking Arguments about Metaphysics
  •  751
    Is sex binary?
    Arc Digital. 2018.
    Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling's New York Times Op-Ed, in which she purports to explain why sex isn't binary.
    Intersexuality
  •  75
    The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, 2nd Edition (edited book)
    with Gideon Rosen, Elizabeth Harman, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Shiffrin
    W.W. Norton & Company. 2018.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyValue Theory
  •  348
    Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color
    with David R. Hilbert
    MIT Press. 1997.
    "This admirable volume of readings is the first of a pair: the editors are to be applauded for placing the philosophy of color exactly where it should go, in...
    Theories of Color, MiscThe Inverted SpectrumColor, MiscPhysicalist Theories of Color
  •  204
    Transparency and Self-Knowledge
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment.
    First-Person Authority and Privileged AccessExpression-Based Accounts of Self-KnowledgeRationality-B…Read more
    First-Person Authority and Privileged AccessExpression-Based Accounts of Self-KnowledgeRationality-Based Accounts of Self-KnowledgeObservation-Based Accounts of Self-KnowledgeIntrospection and Introspectionism
  •  309
    Review: Soames on Quine and Davidson (review)
    Philosophical Studies 135 (3): 439-449. 2007.
    A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames' "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II"
    Philosophy of AnthropologyDonald DavidsonW. V. O. QuineTranslation
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