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238Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (edited book)MIT Press. 2009.Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
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147Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of PerceptionPhilosophical Review 108 (3): 415. 1999.Problems of Vision is divided into three parts. The first part argues for the “insight at [the] core” of the causal theory of perception.
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324On Misinterpreting Kripke’s WittgensteinPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 339-344. 1996.Saul Kripke’s much discussed Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has, I believe, been widely misinterpreted. The purpose of this note is to offer a correction. As it happens, on my reading of Kripke’s text Kripke’s Wittgenstein begins to look recognisably like Wittgenstein himself. But I shall not be concerned here with the question of whether Kripke’s Wittgenstein is Wittgenstein. My only aim is to correct the misinterpretation.
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632Color and the Mind-Body ProblemDialectica 60 (3): 223-244. 2006.b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
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38Knowing our mindsBoston Review. 2005.ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
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155It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon.
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78Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience. Our target article had three aims: (a) to explain clearly the structure of the debate about color realism; (b) to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to t…Read more
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3738InterpretivismEuropean Review of Philosophy 3 (Response-Dependence): 199-223. 1998.In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
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201Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception, by Mohan Matthen.: Book ReviewsMind 119 (476): 1206-1210. 2010.
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1084Experience and contentPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 429-451. 2009.The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the c…Read more
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59Review of Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (1). 2006.
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482Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanicsPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 370-90. 1999.The textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, in a nutshell, is this. The physical state of any isolated system evolves deterministically in accordance with Schrödinger's equation until a "measurement" of some physical magnitude M (e.g. position, energy, spin) is made. Restricting attention to the case where the values of M are discrete, the system's pre-measurement state-vector f is a linear combination, or "superposition", of vectors f1, f2,... that individually represent states that..
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943Knowing what I seeIn Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 183-210. 2012.How do I know that I see a cat? A curiously under-asked question. The paper tries to answer it.
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332Yes, Virginia, Lemons are YellowPhilosophical Studies 108 (1-2): 213-222. 2002.This paper discusses a number of themes and arguments in The Quest for Reality: Stroud's distinction between “philosophical” and “ordinary” questions about reality; the similarity he finds between the view that coloris “unreal” and the view that it is “subjective”; his argument against thesecondary quality theory; his argument against the error theory; and the “disappointing” conclusion of the book.
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779Bad intensionsIn Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 38--54. 2006._the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all.
