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1347McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etcIn Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism.
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1235Knowing what I wantIn JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2011.How do you know what you want? The question is neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.
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196IntroductionIn Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2009.
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1649Transparency, belief, intentionAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 201-21. 2011.This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
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182As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows.
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246Review: Semantic Values? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 201-207. 2002.Lance and Hawthorne have served up a large, rich and argument-stuffed book that has much to teach us about central issues in the philosophy of language, as well as sports trivia. I shall concentrate, not surprisingly, on points I either disagreed with or found unclear; there are many acute observations, particularly in the second half of the book, that fall into neither of these categories.
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238Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (edited book)MIT Press. 2009.Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
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150Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of PerceptionPhilosophical Review 108 (3): 415. 1999.Problems of Vision is divided into three parts. The first part argues for the “insight at [the] core” of the causal theory of perception.
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633Color and the Mind-Body ProblemDialectica 60 (3): 223-244. 2006.b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
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324On Misinterpreting Kripke’s WittgensteinPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 339-344. 1996.Saul Kripke’s much discussed Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has, I believe, been widely misinterpreted. The purpose of this note is to offer a correction. As it happens, on my reading of Kripke’s text Kripke’s Wittgenstein begins to look recognisably like Wittgenstein himself. But I shall not be concerned here with the question of whether Kripke’s Wittgenstein is Wittgenstein. My only aim is to correct the misinterpretation.
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155It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon.
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78Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience. Our target article had three aims: (a) to explain clearly the structure of the debate about color realism; (b) to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to t…Read more
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38Knowing our mindsBoston Review. 2005.ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
