•  526
    Comments
    Dialectica 60 (3). 2006.
  •  22
    analytic tradition, from its early 20th-century roots in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell through Saul Kripke’s pioneering advances in..
  •  318
    Truth in fiction: The story continued
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.
  •  375
    In Defence of the Hybrid View
    with M. Thau
    Mind 105 (417): 139-149. 1996.
    argument fails, and the purpose of this note is to bring out that failure. The view in question which Heck calls the Hybrid Vie~istinguishes between the meanings of names and the contents of beliefs which are expressible using names. According to the Hybrid View the meaning of a name is its referent: names do not have senses. Thus (a) "George Orwell wrote 1984" means the same as (b) "Eric Blair wrote 1984". However, the Hybrid View tells a different story about the beliefs one expresses when one…Read more
  •  76
    Is snow white?
    Boston Review. 2005.
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  •  554
    Hill on mind
    Philosophical Studies 173 831-39. 2016.
    Hill's views on visual experience are critically examined.
  •  543
    Spin control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World
    Philosophical Issues 7 261-73. 1996.
    We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good.
  •  75
    Dennett versus Gibson
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 751-752. 1998.
    Pessoa et al. misinterpret some of Dennett's discussion of filling-in. Their argument against the representational conception of vision and for a Gibsonian alternative is also flawed.
  •  998
    Review Essay of Dorit Bar‐On’s Speaking My Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 705-17. 2011.
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criti…Read more
  •  79
  •  1347
    McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc
    In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.
    On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism.
  •  1235
    Knowing what I want
    In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2011.
    How do you know what you want? The question is neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.
  •  196
    Introduction
    In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2009.
  •  1649
    Transparency, belief, intention
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 201-21. 2011.
    This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.