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Alex Byrne

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    166
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    17
  •  News and Updates
    63

 More details
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
    Professor
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1993
CV
Homepage
0000-0003-3652-1492
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Gender
Philosophy of Sexual Orientation
Philosophy of Sexuality
PhilPapers Editorships
Color Experience
Color
Physicalist Theories of Color
Dispositionalist Theories of Color
Primitivist Theories of Color
Theories of Color, Misc
Color Realism
Color Irrealism
Color Terms
Color, Misc
5 more
  • All publications (166)
  •  2884
    Rich or thin?
    with Susanna Siegel
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. pp. 59-80. 2018.
    Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties
    Modularity in Cognitive ScienceThe Experience of High-Level PropertiesModularity and Cognitive Penet…Read more
    Modularity in Cognitive ScienceThe Experience of High-Level PropertiesModularity and Cognitive PenetrabilityThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  526
    Comments
    Dialectica 60 (3). 2006.
  •  76
    Is snow white?
    Boston Review. 2005.
    CURRENT ISSUE table of contents FEATURES new democracy forum new fiction forum poetry fiction film archives ABOUT US masthead mission rave reviews contests writers? guidelines internships advertising SERVICES bookstore locator literary links subscribe.
    ColorIdealismAesthetic Realism and Anti-Realism, Misc
  •  321
    Truth in fiction: The story continued
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.
    Truth in Fiction
  •  376
    In Defence of the Hybrid View
    with M. Thau
    Mind 105 (417): 139-149. 1996.
    argument fails, and the purpose of this note is to bring out that failure. The view in question which Heck calls the Hybrid Vie~istinguishes between the meanings of names and the contents of beliefs which are expressible using names. According to the Hybrid View the meaning of a name is its referent: names do not have senses. Thus (a) "George Orwell wrote 1984" means the same as (b) "Eric Blair wrote 1984". However, the Hybrid View tells a different story about the beliefs one expresses when one…Read more
    argument fails, and the purpose of this note is to bring out that failure. The view in question which Heck calls the Hybrid Vie~istinguishes between the meanings of names and the contents of beliefs which are expressible using names. According to the Hybrid View the meaning of a name is its referent: names do not have senses. Thus (a) "George Orwell wrote 1984" means the same as (b) "Eric Blair wrote 1984". However, the Hybrid View tells a different story about the beliefs one expresses when one utters (a) or (b). The content of a belief expressed using a sentence that contains a name has more to it than just the referent of the name and whatever properties the sentence ascribes to the name's referent. There is..
    EthicsIntentionalityPropositional Attitudes
  •  554
    Hill on mind
    Philosophical Studies 173 831-39. 2016.
    Hill's views on visual experience are critically examined.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  543
    Spin control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World
    Philosophical Issues 7 261-73. 1996.
    We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good.
    Perceptual JustificationThe GivenPerceptual Evidence
  •  999
    Review Essay of Dorit Bar‐On’s Speaking My Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 705-17. 2011.
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criti…Read more
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her self-ascription or to reject it on the basis of our contrary judgement. Furthermore, unlike ordinary empirical reports, and somewhat like apriori statements, avowals are issued with a very high degree of confidence and are not easily subjected to doubt. (3) The project of this ambitious, original, and challenging book is to explain why avowals have this distinctive security. Bar-On’s guiding idea is that avowals “can be seen as pieces of expressive behavior, similar in certain ways to bits of behavior that naturally express subjects’ states” (227). Crying and moaning are natural expressions of pain, yawning is a natural expression of tiredness, reaching for beer is a natural expression of the desire for beer, and so on. In some important sense, avowals are supposed to be like that. In what sense, though? It will be useful to begin with the simplest answer.
    Expression-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  •  75
    Dennett versus Gibson
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 751-752. 1998.
    Pessoa et al. misinterpret some of Dennett's discussion of filling-in. Their argument against the representational conception of vision and for a Gibsonian alternative is also flawed.
    Perception
  •  2370
    Possibility and imagination
    Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
    Conceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityKripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
  •  79
    Cosmic Hermeneutics
    Noûs 33 (s13): 347-383. 1999.
    Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment
  •  1240
    Knowing what I want
    In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2011.
    How do you know what you want? The question is neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.
    First-Person Authority and Privileged Access
  •  4
    What mind-body problem?
    Boston Review 3 27-30. 2006.
    Metaphysics of MindMind-Body Problem, General
  •  1347
    McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc
    In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press. 2013.
    On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism.
    Perception and Skepticism
  •  199
    Introduction
    with Heather Logue
    In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2009.
    Disjunctivism
  •  1653
    Transparency, belief, intention
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 201-21. 2011.
    This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
    First-Person Authority and Privileged Access
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