-
927The epistemic significance of experiencePhilosophical Studies 173 947-67. 2016.According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended
-
22analytic tradition, from its early 20th-century roots in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell through Saul Kripke’s pioneering advances in..
-
32Some Like It Hot: Consciousness and Higher-Order ThoughtsPhilosophical Studies 86 (2): 103-129. 1997.
-
623Bad intensionsIn Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 38--54. 2006._the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all
-
43Is snow white?Boston Review. 2005.CURRENT ISSUE table of contents FEATURES new democracy forum new fiction forum poetry fiction film archives ABOUT US masthead mission rave reviews contests writers? guidelines internships advertising SERVICES bookstore locator literary links subscribe
-
729Something about MaryGrazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1): 27-52. 2002.Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.
-
52Review of Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2013.
-
2332InterpretivismEuropean Review of Philosophy 3 (Response-Dependence): 199-223. 1998.In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
-
863Experience and contentPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 429-451. 2009.The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the c…Read more
-
49Two radical neuron doctrinesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 833-833. 1999.G&S describe the radical neuron doctrine in a number of slightly different ways, and we think this hides an important distinction. On the one hand, the radical neuron doctrine is supposed to have the consequence "that a successful theory of the mind will make no reference to anything like the concepts of linguistics or the psychological sciences as we currently understand them", and so Chomskyan linguistics "is doomed from the beginning" (sect. 2.2.2, paras. 2,3).[1] (Note that `a successful the…Read more
-
59Comments on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and LevineDialectica 60 223-244. 2006.Cohen begins by defining ‘Color Physicalism’ so that the position is incompatible with Color Relationalism (unlike Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 7, and note 18). Physicalism, in any event, is something of a distraction, since Cohen’s argument from perceptual variation is directed against any view on which minor color misperception is common (Byrne and Hilbert 2004). A typical color primitivist, for example, is equally vulnerable to the argument. Suppose that normal human observers S1 and S2 are viewin…Read more