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669Knowing what I wantIn JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2011.How do you know what you want? The question is neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer.
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11Semantic Values?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 201-207. 2002.Lance and Hawthorne have served up a large, rich and argument-stuffed book that has much to teach us about central issues in the philosophy of language, as well as sports trivia. I shall concentrate, not surprisingly, on points I either disagreed with or found unclear; there are many acute observations, particularly in the second half of the book, that fall into neither of these categories.
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1352Intentionalism defendedPhilosophical Review 110 (2): 199-240. 2001.Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentiona…Read more
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226BehaviorismIn Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 1994.Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking
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191How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Noûs 38 (2). 2004.The sceptic about the external world presents us with a paradox: an apparently acceptable argument for an apparently unacceptable conclusion—that we do not know anything about the external world. Some paradoxes, for instance the liar and the sorites, are very hard. The defense of a purported solution to either of these two inevitably deploys the latest in high-tech philosophical weaponry. On the other hand, some paradoxes are not at all hard, and may be resolved without much fuss. They do not co…Read more
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223Don't PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousnessA Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. 2001._Consciousness, Color, and Content_ is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye
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40Problems of Vision (review)Philosophical Review 108 (3): 415-418. 1999.Problems of Vision is divided into three parts. The first part argues for the “insight at [the] core” of the causal theory of perception
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45The Norton Introduction to Philosophy (edited book)W. W. Norton. 2015.Edited by a team of four leading philosophers, The Norton Introduction to Philosophy introduces students to contemporary perspectives on major philosophical issues and questions. This text features an impressive array of readings, including 25 specially-commissioned essays by prominent philosophers. A student-friendly presentation, a handy format, and a low price make The Norton Introduction to Philosophy as accessible and affordable as it is up-to-date.
