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57Emotional Rationality and Feelings of BeingIn Jörg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive, De Gruyter. pp. 55-78. 2012.
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667More than a Feeling: Affect as Radical SituatednessMidwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1): 7-26. 2017.It can be tempting to think of affect as a matter of the present moment – a reaction, a feeling, an experience or engagement that unfolds right now. This paper will make the case that affect is better thought of as not only temporally extended but as saturated with temporality, especially with the past. In and through affectivity, concrete, ongoing history continues to weigh on present comportment. In order to spell this out, I sketch a Heidegger-inspired perspective. It revolves around two clai…Read more
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47Empathy’s blind spotMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (2): 249-258. 2014.The aim of this paper is to mount a philosophical challenge to the currently highly visible research and discourse on empathy. The notion of empathetic perspective-shifting—a conceptually demanding, high-level construal of empathy in humans that arguably captures the core meaning of the term—is criticized from the standpoint of a philosophy of normatively accountable agency. Empathy in this demanding sense fails to achieve a true understanding of the other and instead risks to impose the empathi…Read more
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348Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life HackFrontiers in Psychology 7. 2016.In view of the philosophical problems that vex the debate on situated affectivity, it can seem wise to focus on simple cases. Accordingly, theorists often single out scenarios in which an individual employs a device in order to enhance their emotional experience, or to achieve new kinds of experience altogether, such as playing an instrument, going to the movies or sporting a fancy handbag. I argue that this narrow focus on cases that fit a ‘user/resource model’ tends to channel attention away f…Read more
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10Don’t beep me, bro’! – A Worry About IntrospectionIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 187-202. 2016.
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50Embodied targets, or the origins of mind-toolsPhilosophical Psychology 19 (1). 2006.Philosophy of Mental Representation Hugh Clapin (Ed.)Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002332 pages, ISBN: 0198250525 (pbk); $35.00In the cognitive science era, in which philosophers frequ...
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31Empfindungen–Skizze eines nicht-reduktiven, holistischen VerständnissesAllgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 32 (3): 207-225. 2007.
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32Nikolas Rose, Joelle M. Abi‐Rached, Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the Man agement of the MindBerichte Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 37 (2): 183-185. 2014.
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530Affekt und Politik. Neue Dringlichkeiten in einem alten ProblemfeldPhilosophische Rundschau 64 (2): 134-162. 2017.Diese Sammelrezension sondiert philosophische Perspektiven auf politische Affektivität. Judith Mohrmann knüpft in Affekt und Revolution an Arendt und Kant an, um ein »theatrales« Modell der wechselseitigen Bestimmung von Affekt und Politik zu skizzieren. Martha Nussbaum ergänzt in Politische Emotionen ihren politischen Liberalismus mit einem Verständnis öffentlich inszenierter Emotionen, die zur Akzeptanz der Werte liberaldemokratischer Gemeinwesen beitragen sollen. Eine andere Richtung schlage…Read more
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11Buchkritik – Welche Kritik der Neurowissenschaften? Über: Matthias L. Schroeter: Die Industrialisierung des GehirnsDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (4): 625-629. 2012.
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37Depression als HandlungsstörungDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (6): 919-935. 2012.We develop a philosophical interpretation of altered experience in conditions of severe unipolar depression. Drawing on phenomenological analysis, on published depression memoires and on a recent questionnaire study with patients in Britain, we hold that depression is a profound impairment of agency. Its experiential core consists in a paralyzing loss of drive and energy, a suspension of initiative, an inability to adopt a stance and act in accordance with it. Moreover, we show that experiences …Read more
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58Affective Self-Construal and the Sense of AbilityEmotion Review 4 (2): 151-156. 2012.How should we construe the unity, in affective experience, of felt bodily changes on the one hand and intentionality on the other, without forcing affective phenomena into a one-sided theoretical framework such as cognitivism? To answer this question, I will consider the specific kind of self-awareness implicit in affectivity. In particular, I will explore the idea that a bodily sense of ability is crucial for affective self-awareness. Describing the affective ways of “grasping oneself” manifest…Read more
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183Emotions outside the box—the new phenomenology of feeling and corporealityPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2): 241-259. 2011.The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, pub…Read more
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816Affective intentionality and the feeling bodyPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4): 429-444. 2008.This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but q…Read more
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132Affective intentionality and self-consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 17 (2): 506-513. 2008.We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that exist…Read more
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11Jenseits von Ethik. Zur Kritik der neuroethischen Enhancement-DebatteDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (5). 2014.