•  3
    A. Knowledge and Justification: The nature of epistemic justification and its supervenience.B. Understanding and Validation: Two projects of epistemology, one to understand justification, the other to promote it.
  •  32
    Dreams and philosophy
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2). 2005.
    That conception is orthodox in today’s common sense and also historically. Presupposed by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it underlies familiar skeptical paradoxes. Similar orthodoxy is also found in our developing science of sleep and dreaming.[2] Despite such confluence.
  •  19
    Value Matters in Epistemology
    Journal of Philosophy 107 (4): 167-190. 2010.
    In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief? That is a problem posed in Plato’s Meno. A belief that falls short of knowledge seems thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right by luck rather than competence. But how can that be so, if a true belief will provide the same benefits? In order to get to Larissa you do not need to know the way. A true belief will get you there just as well. Is it really always better to know t…Read more
  •  5
    Intuitions and meaning divergence
    Philosophical Psychology 23 (4): 419-426. 2010.
    Survey results are in the first instance utterances, which require interpretation. Moreover, when the results seem to involve disagreement in intuitive responses to a thought experiment, the results are most directly responsive to the scenario as envisaged by the particular subject, where the text of the example can give rise to relevantly different scenarios, depending on how the scenario is shaped by the subjects involved, under the guidance of the text. All of this opens up a defense of intui…Read more
  •  40
    More on Fregean reference
    Philosophical Issues 6 113-122. 1995.
  •  1
    Chapter one. Knowing Full Well
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-13. 2010.
  •  10
  •  18
    Hypothetical reasoning
    Journal of Philosophy 64 (10): 293-305. 1967.
    In his important monograph, Hypothetical Reasoning, Nicholas Rescher develops a modal theory in order to throw some light on the nature of hypothetical reasoning and on the so-called "problem of counterfactual conditionals." I should like both to expound the theory and consider its application.
  •  6
    Replies to commentators on A Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 144 (1): 137-147. 2009.
    Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
  •  5
    Ever since Plato, philosophers have faced one central question: what is the scope and nature of human knowledge? In this volume the distinguished philosopher Ernest Sosa collects essays on this subject written over a period of twenty-five years. All the major topics of contemporary epistemology are covered: the nature of propositional knowledge; externalism versus internalism; foundationalism versus coherentism; and the problem of the criterion. 'Sosa is one of the most prominent and most import…Read more
  •  4
    Classical analysis
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (11): 695-710. 1983.
    The first paragraph of the article reads: "Classical analysis is concerned neither with cataloguing usage nor with intellectual therapy (except of course by aiming to satisfy curiosity and remove puzzlement). Of recent sorts of analysis, it's the attempt to find the "logical structure of the world" or the "logical form" of various facts that chiefly claims our attention. But philosophers in every period have been absorbed by such analysis. Think of the Greek search for real definitions. Or think…Read more
  •  7
    Two conceptions of knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 59-66. 1970.
    Knowledge of the nature of knowledge is deplorably scarce. Fortunately, the reason is not lack of interest. On the contrary, the bewildering variety of competing theories is part of the problem. It is to, be hoped, however, that intensive discussion of such theories will help reduce the scarcity. In what follows I want to contribute to this end by briefly discussing two of the theories.
  •  11
    Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (5): 301-307. 2000.
  •  11
    Generic reliabilism and virtue epistemology
    Philosophical Issues 2 79-92. 1992.
    Problems for Generic Reliabilism lead to a more specific account of knowledge as involving the exercise of intellectual virtues or faculties.
  •  147
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundame…Read more
  •  26
    Reflective knowledge in the best circles
    Journal of Philosophy 94 (8): 410-430. 1997.
    According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved.…Read more
  •  3
    A Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 143 (3): 427-440. 2009.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
  •  2
    Preface
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. 2010.
  •  4
    Boghossian’s F ear of Knowledge (review)
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3). 2008.
  •  13
    Knowing Full Well
    Princeton University Press. 2010.
    In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily f…Read more
  •  2
    On Knowledge and Context
    Journal of Philosophy 83 (10): 584. 1986.
  •  146
    The place of reasons in epistemology
    In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of ce…Read more