•  98
    Serious philosophy and freedom of spirit
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (12): 707-726. 1987.
    I wish to lay out a view of “serious” philosophy, and to consider recent attacks on that view from the side of the “free spirited” philosophy: deconstruction and textualism, hermeneutics, critical theory, and the new pragma-tism. Without defining what all forms of freedom have in common, I shall draw from them a combined critique against seriousness. I will also examine, occasionally and in passing, positive ideas conjured up by the free. But mainly I wish to consider their combined critique of …Read more
  •  98
    Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge (review)
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3). 2008.
  •  66
    On Metaphysical Analysis
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (Supplement): 309-314. 2015.
    What follows offers a solution for the problem of causal deviance in its three varieties. We consider Davidson on action, Grice on perception, and the account of knowledge as apt belief, as belief that gets it right through competence rather than luck. We take up the opposition between such traditional accounts and “disjunctivist” alternatives. And we explore how our take on the point and substance of metaphysical analysis bears on the problem and on competing reactions to it.
  •  276
    Epistemic Agency
    Journal of Philosophy 110 (11): 585-605. 2013.
  • Response
    In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. 2004.
  •  69
    Internal Foundations or Eaternal Virtues?
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3): 761-773. 2006.
  •  29
    A Rejoinder on Actions and De Re Belief
    with Mark Pastin
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.
    Richard Feldman in ‘Actions and De Re Beliefs’ attacks ‘latitudinarian’ accounts of de re belief in terms of de dicta belief, including those defended in print by one or the other of us. Feldman's case against latitudinarian views rests on the claim that such accounts do not allow de re attitudes an explanatory role they obviously can fulfil.
  •  127
    Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits
    In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 203--16. 2009.
  • Philosophical Scepticism
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 263-307. 1994.
  •  78
    Imagery and Imagination
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
  •  99
    Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on Reflective Knowledge (OUP, 2009).
  •  7
    Metaphysics: An Anthology, 1st Edition (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.
    Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more