•  28
  •  52
    Moral Relativism, Cognitivism and Defeasible Rules
    Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1): 116-138. 1994.
    Naturalism rejects a sui generis and fundamental realm of the evaluative or normative. Thought and talk about the good and the right must hence be understood without appeal to any such evaluative or normative concepts or properties. In Sections I and II, we see noncognitivism step forward with its account of evaluative and normative language as fundamentally optative or prescriptive. Prescriptivism falls afoul of several problems. Prominent among them below is the “problem of prima facie reasons…Read more
  •  19
    Vincent A. Tomas 1916-1995
    with John Ladd
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (5). 1996.
  •  23
    The Semantics of Imperatives
    American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1). 1967.
  •  12
    Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley (edited book)
    D. Reidel. 1986.
    A tercentenary conference of March, 1985, drew to Newport, Rhode Island, nearly all the most distinguished Berkeley scholars now active. The conference was organized by the International Berkeley Society, with the support of several institutions and many people. This volume represents a selection of the lead papers deliv ered at that conference, most now revised. The Cartesian marriage of Mind and Body has proved an uneasy union. Each side has claimed supremacy and usurped the rights of the othe…Read more
  •  12
    External realism and philosophy in transition
    Journal of Social Philosophy 22 (1): 183-186. 1991.
    This paper was written for a panel session, in which I was asked to represent an analytic perspective. On reflection I found that there is no such thing, however, and that what best unifies the analytic traditions is not even a set of questions, much less a set of answers, but only agreement on certain standards of clarity and argumentation, and an interest in dialectic and debate. Certain issues have long dominated the analytic agenda, it is true, and I see no better way to represent an analyti…Read more
  • A Companion to Epitemology (edited book)
    Blackwell. 1992.
  •  193
    Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd Edition (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2011.
    Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects.
  •  7
    Ontological and conceptual relativity and the self
    In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    This chapter takes up, in six sections, issues of realism and of ontological and conceptual relativity. Section 1 briefly lays out the kind of absolutist realism of interest in what follows. Section 2 considers arguments against ordinary commonsense entities such as bodies, and for the view that subjects enjoy a superior ontological position. No such argument is found persuasive. I find no good argument against ordinary bodies or other common-sense entities, nor any good argument that subjects e…Read more
  •  67
    The truth of modest realism
    Philosophical Issues 3 177-195. 1993.
    True, the believing could not in those cir- cumstances be there the object of belief being there. accept a notion of correspondence or reference according to which a word or a brain state of ours can refer to some external or or independent (This no more forces
  •  15
    Dreams and Skeptics
    Philosophic Exchange 35 (1). 2005.
    This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.
  •  109
    Responses to Nuccetelli, Lemos, and Bueno
    Metaphilosophy 40 (2): 203-213. 2009.
    Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics.
  •  151
  •  17
    Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 56 (3): 653-656. 2003.
    The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy was held in Boston in August 1998. Twice in this century has there been a philosophy world congress in the United States, both times in Boston. Congresses have long been held every five years, but mostly in France, Germany, Russia, England, and other European countries. Aside from the two in this country, only one had previously been held in the Americas, in Mexico. The organization responsible for holding such congresses is, and has long been, the Fede…Read more
  •  1253
    How to defeat opposition to Moore
    Philosophical Perspectives 13 137-49. 1999.
    What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouem…Read more
  •  64
    Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies summary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attention…Read more
  •  47
    The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher
    with Robin Haack and Nicholas Rescher
    Philosophical Quarterly 31 (123): 172. 1981.
  •  42
    Testimony and coherence
    In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 59--67. 1994.
  •  59
    Causation and conditionals (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1975.
    Mackie, J. L. Causes and conditions.--Taylor, R. The metaphysics of causation.--Scriven, M. Defects of the necessary condition analysis of causation.--Kim, J. Causes and events: Mackie on causation.--Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and determination.--Davidson, D. Causal relations.--Wright, G. H. von. On the logic and epistemology of the causal relation.--Ducasse, C. J. On the nature and the observability of the causal relation.--Sellars, W. S. Counterfactuals.--Chisholm, R. M. Law statements and c…Read more
  • Philosophical Issues, Philosophy of Language (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2007.
    Some of the most distinguished active contributors to the field join together for a collection of their most recent work. Brings together important new papers by many of the most distinguished philosophers of language Takes up some of the central issues in the field in recent years Includes some of the best cutting-edge work in philosophy of language
  •  66
    Goldman’s Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2): 383-400. 2001.