•  114
    Intrinsic preferability and the problem of supererogation
    with Roderick M. Chisholm
    Synthese 16 (3-4). 1966.
    We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.
  •  8
    Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performances
    Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5): 81--94. 2015.
    [ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma especie de normativid…Read more
  •  50
    Scriven on Causation as Explanation
    Theory and Decision 13 (4): 357-361. 1981.
  •  90
    Between internalism and externalism
    Philosophical Issues 1 179-195. 1991.
  • Realism and Relativism
    with Enrique Villaneuva
    Blackwell. 2002.
  •  7
    Sources and Deliverances
    In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Brill | Rodopi. pp. 7--9. 2007.
  •  108
    Are there two grades of knowledge?
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1). 2003.
    [Michael Williams] A response to Sosa's criticisms of Sellars's account of the relation between knowledge and experience, noting that Sellars excludes merely animal knowledge, and hopes to bypass epistemology by an adequate philosophy of mind and language. /// [Ernest Sosa] I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars's Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his …Read more
  •  56
    On our knowledge of matters of fact
    Mind 83 (331): 388-405. 1974.
    The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention, and still demand careful study. Only through such study can we approach correct understanding of propositional knowledge.
  •  56
    Virtue perspectivism: A response to Foley and Fumerton
    Philosophical Issues 5 29-50. 1994.
    I am grateful to both Richards, Foley and Fumerton, for the time and attention that they have given to my work. I have certainly learned from their excellent comments, just as I expected. Given the constraints, however, I must be selective in my response. First of all, I will aim to present my view of human knowledge in a broader context. Against this background I will then respond to several of the points they have made.
  •  118
    Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.
    This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
  •  17
    Replies
    Philosophical Issues 10 (1): 38-42. 2000.
  •  58
    II_— _Ernest Sosa: Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: A Reply to Michael Williams
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 113-130. 2003.
    I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or mind. M…Read more
  •  263
    The epistemology of testimony (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, …Read more
  •  7
    The skeptic's appeal
    In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and skepticism, Westview Press. 1989.
  •  19
    Contextualismo y escepticismo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 9-25. 2000.
  •  95
    Pyrrhonian skepticism and human agency
    Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 1-17. 2013.
  •  21
    Imagery and Imagination
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
  •  3
    Reply to Linda Zagzebski
    In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 319--322. 2004.
  •  151
    Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1): 271-81. 1984.
    The mind-body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the relation …Read more
  •  25
    Two Concepts of Knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 59-66. 1970.
  •  42
    Chapter five. Contextualism
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 96-107. 2010.
  •  233
  •  46
    Roderick Milton Chisholm (1916-1999)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 5-6. 1999.
  •  123
    Replies
    Philosophical Papers 40 (3). 2004.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 341-358, November 2011
  •  5
    Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt
    Philosophical Perspectives 2 139. 1988.