•  58
    Boghossian’s F ear of Knowledge (review)
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3). 2008.
  •  4
    Contents
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. 2010.
  •  42
    Précis
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3). 2006.
  •  141
  •  17
    Experience and the Objects of Perception (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 39 (1): 142-144. 1985.
    This study aims primarily at an account of sensory experience and perception uncommitted to objectual sense data or sense impressions. In the end it does make room for sense impressions, but only as entities somehow abstracted from phenomenological attention to sense experience. The "phenomenological standpoint" is attained by imagining "that a transparent screen has been placed at right angles about three feet from your eyes between you and all the objects before you," and by imagining further …Read more
  •  1295
    The place of reasons in epistemology
    In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of ce…Read more
  •  235
    Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue
    The Monist 68 (2): 226-245. 1985.
    An intellectual virtue is a quality bound to help maximize one’s surplus of truth over error; or so let us assume for now, though a more just conception may include as desiderata also generality, coherence, and explanatory power, unless the value of these is itself explained as derivative from the character of their contribution precisely to one’s surplus of truth over error. This last is an issue I mention in order to lay it aside. Here we assume only a teleological conception of intellectual v…Read more
  •  62
    A Virtue Epistemology presents a new approach to some of the oldest and most gripping problems of philosophy, those of knowledge and scepticism. Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. By adopting a kind of virtue epistemology in line with the tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid, and especially Descartes, he presents an account of knowledge which can be used to shed light on different varieties of s…Read more
  •  105
    Responses to Nuccetelli, Lemos, and Bueno
    Metaphilosophy 40 (2): 203-213. 2009.
    Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics.
  •  44
    De re belief, action explanations, and the essential indexical
    In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.), Modality, morality, and belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge University Press. pp. 235--249. 1995.
  •  35
    Quality and Concept by George Bealer (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 82 (7): 382-387. 1985.
  •  67
    The truth of modest realism
    Philosophical Issues 3 177-195. 1993.
    True, the believing could not in those cir- cumstances be there the object of belief being there. accept a notion of correspondence or reference according to which a word or a brain state of ours can refer to some external or or independent (This no more forces
  •  32
    Is color psychological or biological? Or both?
    Philosophical Issues 7 67-74. 1996.
  •  855
    A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy
    In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 101--112. 2009.
  •  71
    On knowledge and context
    Journal of Philosophy 83 (10): 584-585. 1986.
  •  64
    Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies summary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attention…Read more
  •  299
    This paper takes up the critique of armchair philosophy drawn by some experimental philosophers from survey results. It also takes up a more recent development with increased methodological sophistication. The argument based on disagreement among respondents suggests a much more serious problem for armchair philosophy and puts in question the standing of our would-be discipline
  •  47
    Putnam's Pragmatic Realism
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (12): 605-626. 1993.
  •  1773
    The Epistemology of Disagreement
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  228
    How to resolve the pyrrhonian problematic: A lesson from Descartes (review)
    Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3): 229-249. 1997.
    A main epistemic problematic, found already in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, presents a threefold choice on how a belief may be justified: either through infinitely regressive reasoning, or through circular reasoning, or through reasoning resting ultimately on some foundation. Aristotle himself apparently takes the foundationalist option when he argues that rational intuition is a foundational source of scientific knowledge. The five modes of Agrippa, which pertain to knowledge generally, aga…Read more
  •  109
    Mind-world relations
    Episteme 12 (2): 155-166. 2015.
  •  67
    Propositional knowledge
    Philosophical Studies 20 (3). 1969.
    The received definition of knowledge (as true, evident belief) has recently been questioned by Edmund Gettier with an example whose principle is as follows. A proposition, p, is both evident to and accepted by someone S, who sees that its truth entails (would entail) (that either p is true or q is true). This last is thereby made evident to him, and he accepts it, but it happens to be true only because q is true, since p is in fact false. Hence, inasmuch as he has no evidence for the proposition…Read more
  •  42
    Testimony and coherence
    In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing From Words, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 59--67. 1994.
  •  295
    How competence matters in epistemology
    Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 465-475. 2010.
  •  104
    On the Logic of "Intrinsically Better"
    with Roderick M. Chisholm
    American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3): 244-249. 1966.
  •  10
    Metaphysics: an anthology (edited book)
    Blackwell. 1999.
    Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more
  •  97
    Reflective knowledge
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic ...
  •  19
    Contents and objects of experience
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1): 209-212. 1988.
  • Persons and Other Beings
    Philosophical Perspectives 1 155. 1987.