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94Consciousness and self-knowledgeIn Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. 2003.
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124Précis of "A Virtue Epistemology" (Oxford University Press, 2007)Philosophical Studies 144 (1). 2009.This is a summary of "A Virtue Epistemology", the book that is the subject of this book symposium
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93Knowledge in ActionIn Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel (eds.), Ernest Sosa: Targeting His Philosophy, Springer. pp. 1-13. 2016.It is argued that knowledge is a form of action. It is a kind of successful attempt to attain the truth. The success must avoid a particular sort of “epistemic luck”. It must derive from competence rather than luck. Knowledge, then, is a judgment or belief that aims at truth and attains accuracy not by luck but through the agent’s cognitive adroitness, so that the attainment is apt. A higher grade of knowledge then requires that the agent attain aptly not only the accuracy (truth) but even the a…Read more
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67The truth of modest realismPhilosophical Issues 3 177-195. 1993.True, the believing could not in those cir- cumstances be there the object of belief being there. accept a notion of correspondence or reference according to which a word or a brain state of ours can refer to some external or or independent (This no more forces
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90Beyond scepticism, to the best of our knowledgeMind 97 (386): 153-188. 1988.Epistemology is too far-flung and diverse for a survey in a single essay. I have settled for a snapshot which, though perforce superficial and partial, might yet provide an overview. My perspective is determined by the books and articles prominent in the recent literature and in my own recent courses and seminars. Seeing that the boundaries of our field have shifted through the ages and are even now very ill-marked, I have chosen two central issues, each under vigorous and many-sided discussion …Read more
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34Epistemology today: A perspective in retrospect (review)Philosophical Studies 40 (3). 1981.According to the main tradition, knowledge is either direct or indirect: direct when it intuits some perfectly obvious fact of introspection or a priori necessity; indirect when based on deductive proof stemming ultimately from intuited premises. Simple and compelling though it is, this Cartesian conception of knowledge must be surmounted to avoid skepticism. Seeing that the straight and narrow of deductive proof leads nowhere, C. I. Lewis wisely opts for a highroad of probabilistic inference. B…Read more
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111Responses to Nuccetelli, Lemos, and BuenoMetaphilosophy 40 (2): 203-213. 2009.Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics.
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68Judgment & AgencyOxford University Press UK. 2015.Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their explicit and sustained focus on judgment and epistemic agency. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasizes the role of the social in human knowledge. Ba…Read more
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1779The Epistemology of DisagreementIn David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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451A virtue epistemologyOxford University Press. 2007.Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment.
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102On Reflective Knowledge: replies to Battaly and ReedSynthese 188 (2): 309-321. 2012.This article is a reply to Baron Reed and Heather Battaly, two critics in a book symposium on my Reflective Knowledge. The reply to Reed concerns the main content and structure of Descartes's epistemology. The reply to Battaly concerns how best to deal with epistemic circularity
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64Review: Proper functionalism and virtue epistemology (review)Noûs 27 (1). 1993.Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies summary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attention…Read more