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8Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performancesDisputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5): 81--94. 2015.[ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma especie de normativid…Read more
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125Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its LimitsIn Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 203--16. 2009.
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56On our knowledge of matters of factMind 83 (331): 388-405. 1974.The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention, and still demand careful study. Only through such study can we approach correct understanding of propositional knowledge.
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490Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
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99Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on reflective knowledge (OUP, 2009)Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 43-59. 2011.Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on Reflective Knowledge (OUP, 2009).
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58II_— _Ernest Sosa: Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: A Reply to Michael WilliamsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 113-130. 2003.I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or mind. M…Read more
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107Are there two grades of knowledge?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1). 2003.[Michael Williams] A response to Sosa's criticisms of Sellars's account of the relation between knowledge and experience, noting that Sellars excludes merely animal knowledge, and hopes to bypass epistemology by an adequate philosophy of mind and language. /// [Ernest Sosa] I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars's Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his …Read more
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34Natural theology and naturalist atheology: Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalismIn Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga, Cambridge University Press. 2007.
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21Imagery and ImaginationGrazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
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258The epistemology of testimony (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2006.Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, …Read more
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2'Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism'In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 146--160. 2004.
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1Plantinga on Epistemic InternalismIn Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 73-87. 1996.
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2933. reflective knowledge in the best circlesIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 324. 2003.
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229How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 373-384. 1999.
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121RepliesPhilosophical Papers 40 (3). 2004.Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 341-358, November 2011
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150Mind-body interaction and supervenient causationMidwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1): 271-81. 1984.The mind-body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the relation …Read more
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7Philosophical Issues, Action TheoryWiley-Blackwell. 2012.This is a collection of papers on action theory, very broadly conceived. It contains cutting-edge work by some of the most important contributors in the field
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971For the Love of Truth?In Linda Zagzebski & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-62. 2000.Rational beings pursue and value truth . Intellectual conduct is to be judged, accordingly, by how well it aids our pursuit of that ideal. I ask whether these platitudes mean, and whether they are true.
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