•  3111
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundame…Read more
  •  253
  •  180
    Beyond scepticism, to the best of our knowledge
    Mind 97 (386): 153-188. 1988.
    Epistemology is too far-flung and diverse for a survey in a single essay. I have settled for a snapshot which, though perforce superficial and partial, might yet provide an overview. My perspective is determined by the books and articles prominent in the recent literature and in my own recent courses and seminars. Seeing that the boundaries of our field have shifted through the ages and are even now very ill-marked, I have chosen two central issues, each under vigorous and many-sided discussion …Read more
  •  114
    Virtue perspectivism: A response to Foley and Fumerton
    Philosophical Issues 5 29-50. 1994.
    I am grateful to both Richards, Foley and Fumerton, for the time and attention that they have given to my work. I have certainly learned from their excellent comments, just as I expected. Given the constraints, however, I must be selective in my response. First of all, I will aim to present my view of human knowledge in a broader context. Against this background I will then respond to several of the points they have made.
  •  50
    Précis of A Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 143 (3): 395-395. 2009.
  •  981
    For the Love of Truth?
    In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 49-62. 2001.
    Rational beings pursue and value truth . Intellectual conduct is to be judged, accordingly, by how well it aids our pursuit of that ideal. I ask whether these platitudes mean, and whether they are true.
  •  83
    Replies to My Critics
    Critica 42 (125): 77-93. 2010.
    This paper is a response to the four critics of A Virtue Epistemology (2007). It responds to Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Ram Neta, in that order.