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ConditionIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 149. 1995.
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43Epistemology and primitive truthIn Michael Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Mit Press. 2001.
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35Water, drink, and "moral kinds"Philosophical Issues 8 303-312. 1997.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord puts before us an interesting and original line of thought. Here is its main structure: Naturalist semantics would bring important benefits to ethics. But it has very high costs. Fortunately, we can secure such benefits without the costs, by substituting, for the natural kinds of naturalist semantics, a set of moral kinds determined not by scientific but by moral theory. I find myself stumped by the preliminaries at , however, which need further support, or so I will argue …Read more
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203A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume IOxford University Press. 2007.Ernest Sosa presents a new approach to the problems of knowledge and scepticism. He argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sosa's virtue epistemology illuminates different varieties of scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity.
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Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2010.Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the ph…Read more
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1690Davidson's EpistemologyIn Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy in Focus: Donald Davidson, Cambridge University Press. 2003.Davidson’s epistemology, like Kant’s, features a transcendental argument as its centerpiece. Both philosophers reject any priority, whether epistemological or conceptual, of the subjective over the objective, attempting thus to solve the problem of the external world. For Davidson, three varieties of knowledge are coordinate—knowledge of the self, of other minds, and of the external world. None has priority. Despite the epistemologically coordinate status of the mind and the world, however, the …Read more
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45The status of becoming: What is happening now?Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 26-42. 1979.What is the ontological status of temporal becoming, of the present, or the now? We shall consider in turn four answers to this question: (i) the objective-property doctrine, (ii) the thought-reflexive analysis, (iii) the tensed-exemplification view, and (iv) the form-of-thought account.
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2Intuitions and truthIn Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 208--26. 2006.
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43Abilities, concepts, and externalismIn John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford University Press. 1993.
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Offtrack bets against the skepticIn Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 314. 1987.
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36Replies to my criticsCritica 42 (125): 77-93. 2010.This paper is a response to the four critics of A Virtue Epistemology. It responds to Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Ram Neta, in that order. Este artículo es una respuesta a los cuatro críticos de A Virtue Epistemology. Ofrece respuestas a Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, y Ram Neta, en ese orden.
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87The essentials of personsDialectica 53 (3-4): 227-41. 1999.This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.
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5On the propositional relation theory of perceptionGrazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1): 205-208. 1988.
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1Moore's ProofIn Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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31Roderick Milton Chisholm 1916-1999Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
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20Chapter seven. Knowledge: Instrumental and TestimonialIn Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 128-139. 2010.
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74Perspectives in virtue epistemology: A response to Dancy and BonJour (review)Philosophical Studies 78 (3). 1995.A reply to critiques by Jonathan Dancy and Lawrence Bonjour of "Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology" (Cambridge University Press, 1991)
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How Are Experiments Relevant to Intuitions?In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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113Intrinsic preferability and the problem of supererogationSynthese 16 (3-4). 1966.We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.
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43Knowledge, Reflection, and ActionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3): 253-265. 2015.Our main topic is epistemic agency, which can be either free or unfree. This aligns with a distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the reflective and the animal. We first take up the nature and significance of these two sorts of knowledge, starting with the refl ective. In a second section we then consider the nature of suspension and how that relates suspension to higher orders of meta-belief. Finally, we consider a distinction in epistemology between animal competence and refl ective justi…Read more
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331Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic statusPhilosophical Studies 81 (2-3): 151--162. 1996.A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.
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36Circularity and epistemic priority.”In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 113. 2004.
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8Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performancesDisputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5): 81--94. 2015.[ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma especie de normativid…Read more