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165Privileged accessIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 238-251. 2002.In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002).
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3Skepticism and the internal/external divideIn John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 145--57. 1999.
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29A Rejoinder on Actions and De Re BeliefCanadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.Richard Feldman in ‘Actions and De Re Beliefs’ attacks ‘latitudinarian’ accounts of de re belief in terms of de dicta belief, including those defended in print by one or the other of us. Feldman's case against latitudinarian views rests on the claim that such accounts do not allow de re attitudes an explanatory role they obviously can fulfil.
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65On Metaphysical AnalysisJournal of Philosophical Research 40 (Supplement): 309-314. 2015.What follows offers a solution for the problem of causal deviance in its three varieties. We consider Davidson on action, Grice on perception, and the account of knowledge as apt belief, as belief that gets it right through competence rather than luck. We take up the opposition between such traditional accounts and “disjunctivist” alternatives. And we explore how our take on the point and substance of metaphysical analysis bears on the problem and on competing reactions to it.
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10Reliability andIn John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 369. 2002.
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78Imagery and ImaginationGrazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
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6Metaphysics: An Anthology, 1st Edition (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more
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638Value Matters in EpistemologyJournal of Philosophy 107 (4): 167-190. 2010.In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief? That is a problem posed in Plato’s Meno. A belief that falls short of knowledge seems thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right by luck rather than competence. But how can that be so, if a true belief will provide the same benefits? In order to get to Larissa you do not need to know the way. A true belief will get you there just as well. Is it really always better to know t…Read more
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14Chapter three. Value Matters in EpistemologyIn Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 35-66. 2010.
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93Replies to commentators on A Virtue EpistemologyPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 137-147. 2009.Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
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111Human knowledge, animal and reflectivePhilosophical Studies 106 (3). 2001.Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, wh…Read more
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15Minimal IntuitionIn Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 257-269. 1998.
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19Chapter eight. Epistemic CircularityIn Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 140-158. 2010.
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839Reflective knowledge in the best circlesJournal of Philosophy 94 (8): 410-430. 1997.According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved.…Read more
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74Fregean reference defendedPhilosophical Issues 6 91-99. 1995.What is involved in acquiring a russellian proposition (x, φ) as content of an attitude: what does it take for one to acquire such an attitude de re? How do we gain access to x itself so as to be able to have (x, φ) as content of our thought?
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126Reliabilism and Intellectual VirtueIn Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 33-40. 2000.
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67Two conceptions of knowledgeJournal of Philosophy 67 (3): 59-66. 1970.Knowledge of the nature of knowledge is deplorably scarce. Fortunately, the reason is not lack of interest. On the contrary, the bewildering variety of competing theories is part of the problem. It is to, be hoped, however, that intensive discussion of such theories will help reduce the scarcity. In what follows I want to contribute to this end by briefly discussing two of the theories.
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47Knowledge in context, skepticism in doubt: The virtue of our facultiesPhilosophical Perspectives 2 139-155. 1988.
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ConditionIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 149. 1995.
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60Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology (review)In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 253-270. 1996.Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies sum- mary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attenti…Read more