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91Methodology and Apt beliefSynthese 74 (3). 1988.The theory of knowledge has two sides - epistemology and a bridge to join them: that a belief is justified if and only if obtained by appropriate use of an adequate organon - a principle of theoretical epistemology requiring an organon or manual of practical methodology. Such organon justification is internalist. (How could one ever miss one's source for it?) But it leads briskly to skepticism on pain of regress or circularity - or so it is argued in section 1. In section 2 we consider the epist…Read more
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86Beyond scepticism, to the best of our knowledgeMind 97 (386): 153-188. 1988.Epistemology is too far-flung and diverse for a survey in a single essay. I have settled for a snapshot which, though perforce superficial and partial, might yet provide an overview. My perspective is determined by the books and articles prominent in the recent literature and in my own recent courses and seminars. Seeing that the boundaries of our field have shifted through the ages and are even now very ill-marked, I have chosen two central issues, each under vigorous and many-sided discussion …Read more
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34Epistemology today: A perspective in retrospect (review)Philosophical Studies 40 (3). 1981.According to the main tradition, knowledge is either direct or indirect: direct when it intuits some perfectly obvious fact of introspection or a priori necessity; indirect when based on deductive proof stemming ultimately from intuited premises. Simple and compelling though it is, this Cartesian conception of knowledge must be surmounted to avoid skepticism. Seeing that the straight and narrow of deductive proof leads nowhere, C. I. Lewis wisely opts for a highroad of probabilistic inference. B…Read more
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91Knowledge in ActionIn Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel (eds.), Ernest Sosa: Targeting His Philosophy, Springer. pp. 1-13. 2016.It is argued that knowledge is a form of action. It is a kind of successful attempt to attain the truth. The success must avoid a particular sort of “epistemic luck”. It must derive from competence rather than luck. Knowledge, then, is a judgment or belief that aims at truth and attains accuracy not by luck but through the agent’s cognitive adroitness, so that the attainment is apt. A higher grade of knowledge then requires that the agent attain aptly not only the accuracy (truth) but even the a…Read more
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100On Reflective Knowledge: replies to Battaly and ReedSynthese 188 (2): 309-321. 2012.This article is a reply to Baron Reed and Heather Battaly, two critics in a book symposium on my Reflective Knowledge. The reply to Reed concerns the main content and structure of Descartes's epistemology. The reply to Battaly concerns how best to deal with epistemic circularity
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124Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its LimitsIn Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 203--16. 2009.
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66Judgment & AgencyOxford University Press UK. 2015.Ernest Sosa extends his distinctive approach to epistemology, intertwining issues concerning the role of the will in judgment and belief with issues of epistemic evaluation. Questions about skepticism and the nature of knowledge are at the forefront. The answers defended are new in their explicit and sustained focus on judgment and epistemic agency. While noting that human knowledge trades on distinctive psychological capacities, Sosa also emphasizes the role of the social in human knowledge. Ba…Read more
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98Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on reflective knowledge (OUP, 2009)Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 43-59. 2011.Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on Reflective Knowledge (OUP, 2009).
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411A virtue epistemologyOxford University Press. 2007.Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment.
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7Ontological and conceptual relativity and the selfIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.This chapter takes up, in six sections, issues of realism and of ontological and conceptual relativity. Section 1 briefly lays out the kind of absolutist realism of interest in what follows. Section 2 considers arguments against ordinary commonsense entities such as bodies, and for the view that subjects enjoy a superior ontological position. No such argument is found persuasive. I find no good argument against ordinary bodies or other common-sense entities, nor any good argument that subjects e…Read more
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2'Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism'In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 146--160. 2004.
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15Dreams and SkepticsPhilosophic Exchange 35 (1). 2005.This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.
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1``Postscript to Proper Function and Virtue Epistemology"In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contempoary Epistemology, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 271-280. 1996.
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20Consciousness of self and of the presentIn James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, Hackett. 1983.
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16Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (review)Review of Metaphysics 56 (3): 653-656. 2003.The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy was held in Boston in August 1998. Twice in this century has there been a philosophy world congress in the United States, both times in Boston. Congresses have long been held every five years, but mostly in France, Germany, Russia, England, and other European countries. Aside from the two in this country, only one had previously been held in the Americas, in Mexico. The organization responsible for holding such congresses is, and has long been, the Fede…Read more
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1282How to defeat opposition to MoorePhilosophical Perspectives 13 137-49. 1999.What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouem…Read more
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2833. reflective knowledge in the best circlesIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 324. 2003.
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57Causation and conditionals (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1975.Mackie, J. L. Causes and conditions.--Taylor, R. The metaphysics of causation.--Scriven, M. Defects of the necessary condition analysis of causation.--Kim, J. Causes and events: Mackie on causation.--Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and determination.--Davidson, D. Causal relations.--Wright, G. H. von. On the logic and epistemology of the causal relation.--Ducasse, C. J. On the nature and the observability of the causal relation.--Sellars, W. S. Counterfactuals.--Chisholm, R. M. Law statements and c…Read more
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Philosophical Issues, Philosophy of Language (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2007.Some of the most distinguished active contributors to the field join together for a collection of their most recent work. Brings together important new papers by many of the most distinguished philosophers of language Takes up some of the central issues in the field in recent years Includes some of the best cutting-edge work in philosophy of language