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Ernest Sosa

Rutgers - New Brunswick
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  •  Publications
    398
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Rutgers - New Brunswick
    Department of Philosophy
    Associate Professor
University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1964
Homepage
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
  • All publications (398)
  •  863
    A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Ernest Sosa presents a new approach to the problems of knowledge and scepticism. He argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sosa's virtue epistemology illuminates different varieties of scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity.
    Varieties of Skepticism, MiscReplies to Skepticism, MiscThe Nature of IntuitionEpistemology of Intui…Read more
    Varieties of Skepticism, MiscReplies to Skepticism, MiscThe Nature of IntuitionEpistemology of IntuitionEpistemic VirtuesVirtue EpistemologySeemings
  •  126
    The status of becoming: What is happening now?
    Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 26-42. 1979.
    What is the ontological status of temporal becoming, of the present, or the now? We shall consider in turn four answers to this question: (i) the objective-property doctrine, (ii) the thought-reflexive analysis, (iii) the tensed-exemplification view, and (iv) the form-of-thought account.
    The Passage of Time, MiscPresentism
  •  48
    Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (5): 301-307. 2000.
  •  43
    `"Epistemic Presupposition"'
    In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, D. Reidel. pp. 79-92. 1979.
    The Gettier Problem
  •  65
    Roderick Milton Chisholm 1916-1999
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
    Roderick Chisholm
  •  76
    Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology
    with Frederick F. Schmitt
    Philosophical Review 102 (3): 421. 1993.
    Virtue Epistemology
  •  157
    The coherence of virtue and the virtue of coherence
    Synthese 64 (1). 1985.
    Polyfacetic epistemology would answer the skeptic, provide how-to-think manuals, explain how we know, and more. To some it is the project of assuring oneself, of validating one's knowledge or supposed knowledge, turning it into real and assured knowledge, thus defeating the skeptic. To others it is a set of rules or instructions, a guide to the perplexed, a manual for conducting the intellect. To others yet it is a meta-discipline, but one whose purpose is not nearly so much guidance as understa…Read more
    Polyfacetic epistemology would answer the skeptic, provide how-to-think manuals, explain how we know, and more. To some it is the project of assuring oneself, of validating one's knowledge or supposed knowledge, turning it into real and assured knowledge, thus defeating the skeptic. To others it is a set of rules or instructions, a guide to the perplexed, a manual for conducting the intellect. To others yet it is a meta-discipline, but one whose purpose is not nearly so much guidance as understanding, understanding of what gives us the knowledge we do have, of what factors serve to justify so many of our beliefs well enough to make them knowledge. What follows is epistemology as understanding, an attempt to understand the relation between epistemic coherence and intellectual virtue at the foundation of epistemology: between the comprehensive coherence prized in the thirst for understanding and the "reliability" that makes a faculty or procedure intellectually virtuous.
    Epistemic VirtuesVirtue EpistemologyReplies to Skepticism, Misc
  •  112
    Précis
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3). 2006.
    Virtue Epistemology
  •  77
    De re belief, action explanations, and the essential indexical
    In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.), Modality, morality, and belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge University Press. pp. 235--249. 1995.
    First-Person Contents
  • Rastreo, competencia y conocimiento
    Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència 34 41-59. 2004.
  •  363
    II— Ernest Sosa: Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: A Reply to Michael Williams
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 113-130. 2003.
    I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or mind. M…Read more
    I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or mind. My own take is in line with Descartes’ two-level epistemology of cognitio and scientia, a bifurcation that protects him from vicious circularity, and is adaptable for an epistemology naturalized, whether in the way of Quine, or Moore, or Davidson.
    Virtue Epistemology20th Century American Philosophy
  •  186
    Replies
    Philosophical Papers 40 (3). 2004.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 341-358, November 2011
    Contextualist Replies to Skepticism
  •  350
    Sosa on propositional attitudes de dicto and de re: Rejoinder to Hintikka
    Journal of Philosophy 68 (16): 498-501. 1971.
    De Re Belief
  • Offtrack bets against the skeptic
    In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 314. 1987.
    Replies to Skepticism, Misc
  •  331
    Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions?
    Mind and Language 26 (4): 453-467. 2011.
    This paper takes up the critique of armchair philosophy drawn by some experimental philosophers from survey results. It also takes up a more recent development with increased methodological sophistication. The argument based on disagreement among respondents suggests a much more serious problem for armchair philosophy and puts in question the standing of our would-be discipline
    Foundations of Experimental PhilosophyIntuition
  •  44
    Replies
    Noûs 34 (s1): 38-42. 2000.
  •  203
    Imagery and Imagination Sensory Images and Fictional Characters
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1986.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. Conclusion.
    Mental ImageryImagination
  •  218
    Mythology of the Given
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (3). 1997.
    The GivenFoundationalism and CoherentismWilfrid Sellars
  •  78
    Contents and objects of experience
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1): 209-212. 1988.
    The Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  6
    Philosophical Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity
    In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. 1999.
    Epistemological TheoriesVirtue Epistemology
  •  181
    Human knowledge, animal and reflective
    Philosophical Studies 106 (3). 2001.
    Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, wh…Read more
    Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, which he takes to be quite distinct from knowledge. Once knowledge and understanding are seen to be distinct, finally, this will help us to avoid the two untoward consequences. I am grateful for these interesting points, and would like to respond briefly in what follows.
    Virtue Epistemology
  •  157
    Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue
    In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 33-40. 2000.
    Virtue EpistemologyEpistemic Virtues
  •  1
    Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2010.
    Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the ph…Read more
    Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes. Professor Kim explores this problem in detail, criticises the nonreductionist solution of it, and offers a modified reductionist solution of his own. Both professional philosophers and their graduate students will find this an invaluable collection.
    The Exclusion ProblemPsychophysical SupervenienceSupervenience and PhysicalismSupervenience, GeneralRead more
    The Exclusion ProblemPsychophysical SupervenienceSupervenience and PhysicalismSupervenience, GeneralSupervenient Causation
  •  319
    Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology
    Cambridge University Press. 1991.
    Ever since Plato, philosophers have faced one central question: what is the scope and nature of human knowledge? In this volume the distinguished philosopher Ernest Sosa collects essays on this subject written over a period of twenty-five years. All the major topics of contemporary epistemology are covered: the nature of propositional knowledge; externalism versus internalism; foundationalism versus coherentism; and the problem of the criterion. 'Sosa is one of the most prominent and most import…Read more
    Ever since Plato, philosophers have faced one central question: what is the scope and nature of human knowledge? In this volume the distinguished philosopher Ernest Sosa collects essays on this subject written over a period of twenty-five years. All the major topics of contemporary epistemology are covered: the nature of propositional knowledge; externalism versus internalism; foundationalism versus coherentism; and the problem of the criterion. 'Sosa is one of the most prominent and most important epistemologists on the current American scene.' William P. Alston, Syracuse University.
    Virtue Epistemology
  •  16
    Berkeley's master stroke
    In John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: a tercentennial celebration, Oxford University Press. 1985.
    Berkeley: Immaterialism
  •  188
    Varieties of Causation
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1): 93-103. 1980.
    According to nomological accounts of causation causal connections among events or states must be mediated by contingent laws of nature. Three types of causal connection are cited and discussed in opposition to such nomological accounts: (a) material causation (as when a zygote is generated by the union of an ovum and a sperm); (b) consequentialist causation (as when an apple is chromatically colored as a result of being red); (c) inclusive causation (as when a board is on a stump in consequence …Read more
    According to nomological accounts of causation causal connections among events or states must be mediated by contingent laws of nature. Three types of causal connection are cited and discussed in opposition to such nomological accounts: (a) material causation (as when a zygote is generated by the union of an ovum and a sperm); (b) consequentialist causation (as when an apple is chromatically colored as a result of being red); (c) inclusive causation (as when a board is on a stump in consequence of its having been placed there by a carpenter). These are all source-consequence relations or result-yielding relations and they are all cases of necessitation, each with its own distinguishing features.
    Causation and Laws of Nature
  •  308
    Précis of "A Virtue Epistemology" (Oxford University Press, 2007)
    Philosophical Studies 144 (1). 2009.
    This is a summary of "A Virtue Epistemology", the book that is the subject of this book symposium
    Virtue Epistemology
  •  159
    Fregean reference defended
    Philosophical Issues 6 91-99. 1995.
    What is involved in acquiring a russellian proposition (x, φ) as content of an attitude: what does it take for one to acquire such an attitude de re? How do we gain access to x itself so as to be able to have (x, φ) as content of our thought?
    Theories of ReferenceSemantic TheoriesDe Re BeliefStructured Propositions
  •  5
    Reply to Linda Zagzebski
    In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 319--322. 2008.
    Virtue Epistemology
  •  2
    Ayer on perception and reality
    In The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer, Peru: Open Court. 1992.
    The Nature of Perceptual Experience, MiscA. J. Ayer
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