•  16
    Replies
    Noûs 34 (s1): 38-42. 2000.
  •  104
    A. Knowledge and Justification: The nature of epistemic justification and its supervenience.B. Understanding and Validation: Two projects of epistemology, one to understand justification, the other to promote it.
  •  90
    Summary ofReflective Knowledge
    Philosophical Papers 40 (3): 285-285. 2011.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 285, November 2011
  •  1171
    Dreams and philosophy
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2). 2005.
    That conception is orthodox in today’s common sense and also historically. Presupposed by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it underlies familiar skeptical paradoxes. Similar orthodoxy is also found in our developing science of sleep and dreaming.[2] Despite such confluence.
  •  210
    Intuitions and meaning divergence
    Philosophical Psychology 23 (4): 419-426. 2010.
    Survey results are in the first instance utterances, which require interpretation. Moreover, when the results seem to involve disagreement in intuitive responses to a thought experiment, the results are most directly responsive to the scenario as envisaged by the particular subject, where the text of the example can give rise to relevantly different scenarios, depending on how the scenario is shaped by the subjects involved, under the guidance of the text. All of this opens up a defense of intui…Read more
  •  40
    More on Fregean reference
    Philosophical Issues 6 113-122. 1995.
  • Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2010.
    Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the ph…Read more
  •  16
    Chapter one. Knowing Full Well
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 1-13. 2010.
  •  36
    Water, drink, and "moral kinds"
    Philosophical Issues 8 303-312. 1997.
    Geoffrey Sayre-McCord puts before us an interesting and original line of thought. Here is its main structure: Naturalist semantics would bring important benefits to ethics. But it has very high costs. Fortunately, we can secure such benefits without the costs, by substituting, for the natural kinds of naturalist semantics, a set of moral kinds determined not by scientific but by moral theory. I find myself stumped by the preliminaries at , however, which need further support, or so I will argue …Read more
  •  286
    Hypothetical reasoning
    Journal of Philosophy 64 (10): 293-305. 1967.
    In his important monograph, Hypothetical Reasoning, Nicholas Rescher develops a modal theory in order to throw some light on the nature of hypothetical reasoning and on the so-called "problem of counterfactual conditionals." I should like both to expound the theory and consider its application.
  •  33
    Ever since Plato, philosophers have faced one central question: what is the scope and nature of human knowledge? In this volume the distinguished philosopher Ernest Sosa collects essays on this subject written over a period of twenty-five years. All the major topics of contemporary epistemology are covered: the nature of propositional knowledge; externalism versus internalism; foundationalism versus coherentism; and the problem of the criterion. 'Sosa is one of the most prominent and most import…Read more
  •  22
    Replies to my critics
    Critica 42 (125): 77-93. 2010.
    This paper is a response to the four critics of A Virtue Epistemology. It responds to Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Ram Neta, in that order. Este artículo es una respuesta a los cuatro críticos de A Virtue Epistemology. Ofrece respuestas a Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, y Ram Neta, en ese orden.
  •  96
    Classical analysis
    Journal of Philosophy 80 (11): 695-710. 1983.
    The first paragraph of the article reads: "Classical analysis is concerned neither with cataloguing usage nor with intellectual therapy (except of course by aiming to satisfy curiosity and remove puzzlement). Of recent sorts of analysis, it's the attempt to find the "logical structure of the world" or the "logical form" of various facts that chiefly claims our attention. But philosophers in every period have been absorbed by such analysis. Think of the Greek search for real definitions. Or think…Read more
  •  11
    Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (5): 301-307. 2000.
  •  45
    The status of becoming: What is happening now?
    Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 26-42. 1979.
    What is the ontological status of temporal becoming, of the present, or the now? We shall consider in turn four answers to this question: (i) the objective-property doctrine, (ii) the thought-reflexive analysis, (iii) the tensed-exemplification view, and (iv) the form-of-thought account.
  •  116
    Generic reliabilism and virtue epistemology
    Philosophical Issues 2 79-92. 1992.
    Problems for Generic Reliabilism lead to a more specific account of knowledge as involving the exercise of intellectual virtues or faculties.
  •  1291
    Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundame…Read more
  •  151
    Knowing Full Well
    Princeton University Press. 2010.
    In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily f…Read more
  •  31
    Roderick Milton Chisholm 1916-1999
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
  •  3
    A Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 143 (3): 427-440. 2009.
    In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
  •  2
    Preface
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. 2010.
  •  87
    The essentials of persons
    Dialectica 53 (3-4): 227-41. 1999.
    This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.
  •  337
    Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status
    Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3): 151--162. 1996.
    A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.