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124Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its LimitsIn Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 203--16. 2009.
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108Davidson's thinking causesIn John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford University Press. 1993.
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4Interdisciplinary Core PhilosophyWiley-Blackwell. 2009.This collection includes papers that show some of the bearing of indisciplinary work on central questions of philosophy. Three main core subdisciplines are included, and the book is divided into corresponding sections: epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics Focuses on the core areas of Philosophy: epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. Shows how interdisciplinary work can have important bearing even here
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98Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on reflective knowledge (OUP, 2009)Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 43-59. 2011.Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on Reflective Knowledge (OUP, 2009).
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235Metaphysics: An Anthology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.This anthology, intended to accompany _A Companion to Metaphysics_, brings together over 60 selections which represent the best and most important works in metaphysics during this century. The selections are grouped under ten major metaphysical problems and each section is preceded by an introduction by the editors
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154Man the rational animal?Synthese 122 (1-2): 165-78. 2000.This paper considers well known results of psychological researchinto the fallibility of human reason, and philosophical conclusionsthat some have drawn from these results. Close attention to theexact content of the results casts doubt on the reasoning that leadsto those conclusions
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2'Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism'In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 146--160. 2004.
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189Précis of "A Virtue Epistemology" (Oxford University Press, 2007)Philosophical Studies 144 (1). 2009.This is a summary of "A Virtue Epistemology", the book that is the subject of this book symposium
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2933. reflective knowledge in the best circlesIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 324. 2003.
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73Chisholm's Epistemic PrinciplesMetaphilosophy 34 (5): 553-562. 2003.An exposition and discussion of Chisholm's “epistemic principles.” These are compared with relevant views of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Foley. A further comparison, with the approach favored by Descartes, is argued to throw light on the status of such principles.
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91Methodology and Apt beliefSynthese 74 (3). 1988.The theory of knowledge has two sides - epistemology and a bridge to join them: that a belief is justified if and only if obtained by appropriate use of an adequate organon - a principle of theoretical epistemology requiring an organon or manual of practical methodology. Such organon justification is internalist. (How could one ever miss one's source for it?) But it leads briskly to skepticism on pain of regress or circularity - or so it is argued in section 1. In section 2 we consider the epist…Read more
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92Consciousness and self-knowledgeIn Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. 2003.
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34Epistemology today: A perspective in retrospect (review)Philosophical Studies 40 (3). 1981.According to the main tradition, knowledge is either direct or indirect: direct when it intuits some perfectly obvious fact of introspection or a priori necessity; indirect when based on deductive proof stemming ultimately from intuited premises. Simple and compelling though it is, this Cartesian conception of knowledge must be surmounted to avoid skepticism. Seeing that the straight and narrow of deductive proof leads nowhere, C. I. Lewis wisely opts for a highroad of probabilistic inference. B…Read more
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91Knowledge in ActionIn Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel (eds.), Ernest Sosa: Targeting His Philosophy, Springer. pp. 1-13. 2016.It is argued that knowledge is a form of action. It is a kind of successful attempt to attain the truth. The success must avoid a particular sort of “epistemic luck”. It must derive from competence rather than luck. Knowledge, then, is a judgment or belief that aims at truth and attains accuracy not by luck but through the agent’s cognitive adroitness, so that the attainment is apt. A higher grade of knowledge then requires that the agent attain aptly not only the accuracy (truth) but even the a…Read more
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87Beyond scepticism, to the best of our knowledgeMind 97 (386): 153-188. 1988.Epistemology is too far-flung and diverse for a survey in a single essay. I have settled for a snapshot which, though perforce superficial and partial, might yet provide an overview. My perspective is determined by the books and articles prominent in the recent literature and in my own recent courses and seminars. Seeing that the boundaries of our field have shifted through the ages and are even now very ill-marked, I have chosen two central issues, each under vigorous and many-sided discussion …Read more
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56Virtue perspectivism: A response to Foley and FumertonPhilosophical Issues 5 29-50. 1994.I am grateful to both Richards, Foley and Fumerton, for the time and attention that they have given to my work. I have certainly learned from their excellent comments, just as I expected. Given the constraints, however, I must be selective in my response. First of all, I will aim to present my view of human knowledge in a broader context. Against this background I will then respond to several of the points they have made.