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165Privileged accessIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 238-251. 2002.In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002).
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17`"Epistemic Presupposition"'In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, D. Reidel. pp. 79-92. 1979.
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2833. reflective knowledge in the best circlesIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 324. 2003.
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287Knowing full well: the normativity of beliefs as performancesPhilosophical Studies 142 (1): 5-15. 2009.Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belie…Read more
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65On Metaphysical AnalysisJournal of Philosophical Research 40 (Supplement): 309-314. 2015.What follows offers a solution for the problem of causal deviance in its three varieties. We consider Davidson on action, Grice on perception, and the account of knowledge as apt belief, as belief that gets it right through competence rather than luck. We take up the opposition between such traditional accounts and “disjunctivist” alternatives. And we explore how our take on the point and substance of metaphysical analysis bears on the problem and on competing reactions to it.
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29A Rejoinder on Actions and De Re BeliefCanadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.Richard Feldman in ‘Actions and De Re Beliefs’ attacks ‘latitudinarian’ accounts of de re belief in terms of de dicta belief, including those defended in print by one or the other of us. Feldman's case against latitudinarian views rests on the claim that such accounts do not allow de re attitudes an explanatory role they obviously can fulfil.
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14Chapter three. Value Matters in EpistemologyIn Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 35-66. 2010.
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56Virtue perspectivism: A response to Foley and FumertonPhilosophical Issues 5 29-50. 1994.I am grateful to both Richards, Foley and Fumerton, for the time and attention that they have given to my work. I have certainly learned from their excellent comments, just as I expected. Given the constraints, however, I must be selective in my response. First of all, I will aim to present my view of human knowledge in a broader context. Against this background I will then respond to several of the points they have made.
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78Imagery and ImaginationGrazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
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6Metaphysics: An Anthology, 1st Edition (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more
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6Sources and DeliverancesIn Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, . pp. 7--9. 2007.
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19Chapter eight. Epistemic CircularityIn Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 140-158. 2010.
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7The skeptic's appealIn Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Westview Press. 1989.
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111Human knowledge, animal and reflectivePhilosophical Studies 106 (3). 2001.Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, wh…Read more
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15Minimal IntuitionIn Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 257-269. 1998.
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ConditionIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 149. 1995.
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60Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology (review)In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 253-270. 1996.Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies sum- mary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attenti…Read more