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2Intuitions and truthIn Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 208--26. 2006.
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43Abilities, concepts, and externalismIn John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford University Press. 1993.
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Offtrack bets against the skepticIn Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 314. 1987.
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1672Davidson's EpistemologyIn Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy in Focus: Donald Davidson, Cambridge University Press. 2003.Davidson’s epistemology, like Kant’s, features a transcendental argument as its centerpiece. Both philosophers reject any priority, whether epistemological or conceptual, of the subjective over the objective, attempting thus to solve the problem of the external world. For Davidson, three varieties of knowledge are coordinate—knowledge of the self, of other minds, and of the external world. None has priority. Despite the epistemologically coordinate status of the mind and the world, however, the …Read more
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10Reliability andIn John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 369. 2002.
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5On the propositional relation theory of perceptionGrazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1): 205-208. 1988.
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3Skepticism and the internal/external divideIn John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 145--57. 1999.
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1Moore's ProofIn Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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20Chapter seven. Knowledge: Instrumental and TestimonialIn Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 128-139. 2010.
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How Are Experiments Relevant to Intuitions?In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Oup Usa. 2008.
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110Intrinsic preferability and the problem of supererogationSynthese 16 (3-4). 1966.We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.
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43Knowledge, Reflection, and ActionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3): 253-265. 2015.Our main topic is epistemic agency, which can be either free or unfree. This aligns with a distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the reflective and the animal. We first take up the nature and significance of these two sorts of knowledge, starting with the refl ective. In a second section we then consider the nature of suspension and how that relates suspension to higher orders of meta-belief. Finally, we consider a distinction in epistemology between animal competence and refl ective justi…Read more
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36Circularity and epistemic priority.”In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 113. 2004.
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639Value Matters in EpistemologyJournal of Philosophy 107 (4): 167-190. 2010.In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief? That is a problem posed in Plato’s Meno. A belief that falls short of knowledge seems thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right by luck rather than competence. But how can that be so, if a true belief will provide the same benefits? In order to get to Larissa you do not need to know the way. A true belief will get you there just as well. Is it really always better to know t…Read more
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73Perspectives in virtue epistemology: A response to Dancy and BonJour (review)Philosophical Studies 78 (3). 1995.A reply to critiques by Jonathan Dancy and Lawrence Bonjour of "Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology" (Cambridge University Press, 1991)
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93Replies to commentators on A Virtue EpistemologyPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 137-147. 2009.Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
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8Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performancesDisputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5): 81--94. 2015.[ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma especie de normativid…Read more
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15Propositions and indexical attitudesIn Herman [Ed] Parret (ed.), On Believing: Epistemological and Semiotic Approaches, W. De Gruyter. pp. 316--31. 1983.
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839Reflective knowledge in the best circlesJournal of Philosophy 94 (8): 410-430. 1997.According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved.…Read more
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58II_— _Ernest Sosa: Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: A Reply to Michael WilliamsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 113-130. 2003.I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or mind. M…Read more
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107Are there two grades of knowledge?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1). 2003.[Michael Williams] A response to Sosa's criticisms of Sellars's account of the relation between knowledge and experience, noting that Sellars excludes merely animal knowledge, and hopes to bypass epistemology by an adequate philosophy of mind and language. /// [Ernest Sosa] I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars's Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his …Read more