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19On the “content” and “relevance” of information-theoretic epistemologyBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 79-81. 1983.
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51Moral Relativism, Cognitivism and Defeasible RulesSocial Philosophy and Policy 11 (1): 116-138. 1994.Naturalism rejects a sui generis and fundamental realm of the evaluative or normative. Thought and talk about the good and the right must hence be understood without appeal to any such evaluative or normative concepts or properties. In Sections I and II, we see noncognitivism step forward with its account of evaluative and normative language as fundamentally optative or prescriptive. Prescriptivism falls afoul of several problems. Prominent among them below is the “problem of prima facie reasons…Read more
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19Vincent A. Tomas 1916-1995Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (5). 1996.
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11Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley (edited book)D. Reidel. 1986.A tercentenary conference of March, 1985, drew to Newport, Rhode Island, nearly all the most distinguished Berkeley scholars now active. The conference was organized by the International Berkeley Society, with the support of several institutions and many people. This volume represents a selection of the lead papers deliv ered at that conference, most now revised. The Cartesian marriage of Mind and Body has proved an uneasy union. Each side has claimed supremacy and usurped the rights of the othe…Read more
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Consciousness of the Self and the PresentIn James Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language and the Structure of the World, Hackett Publishing Company. pp. 131-47. 1983.
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12External realism and philosophy in transitionJournal of Social Philosophy 22 (1): 183-186. 1991.This paper was written for a panel session, in which I was asked to represent an analytic perspective. On reflection I found that there is no such thing, however, and that what best unifies the analytic traditions is not even a set of questions, much less a set of answers, but only agreement on certain standards of clarity and argumentation, and an interest in dialectic and debate. Certain issues have long dominated the analytic agenda, it is true, and I see no better way to represent an analyti…Read more
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78Situations against virtues : the situationist attack on virtue theoryIn Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, Cambridge University Press. pp. 274--290. 2009.
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190Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd Edition (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2011.Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects.
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10Metaphysics: an anthology (edited book)Blackwell. 1999.Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more
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94Replies to commentators on A Virtue EpistemologyPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 137-147. 2009.Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
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67Propositional knowledgePhilosophical Studies 20 (3). 1969.The received definition of knowledge (as true, evident belief) has recently been questioned by Edmund Gettier with an example whose principle is as follows. A proposition, p, is both evident to and accepted by someone S, who sees that its truth entails (would entail) (that either p is true or q is true). This last is thereby made evident to him, and he accepts it, but it happens to be true only because q is true, since p is in fact false. Hence, inasmuch as he has no evidence for the proposition…Read more
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2Knowledge: Instrumental and testimonialIn Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford University Press. pp. 116--123. 2006.
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16Berkeley's master strokeIn John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: a tercentennial celebration, Oxford University Press. 1985.
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839Reflective knowledge in the best circlesJournal of Philosophy 94 (8): 410-430. 1997.According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved.…Read more
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104Epistemology, realism, and truth: The first philosophical perspectives lecturePhilosophical Perspectives 7 1-16. 1993.Truth centered epistemology puts truth at the center in more ways than one. For one thing, it makes truth a main cognitive goal of inquiry. For another, it explains other main epistemic concepts in terms of truth. Knowledge itself, for example, is explained as belief that meets certain other conditions, among them being true. And a belief is said to be rationally or epistemically justified or apt, which it must be in order to be knowledge, only if it derives from a truth-conducive faculty, an in…Read more
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67Two conceptions of knowledgeJournal of Philosophy 67 (3): 59-66. 1970.Knowledge of the nature of knowledge is deplorably scarce. Fortunately, the reason is not lack of interest. On the contrary, the bewildering variety of competing theories is part of the problem. It is to, be hoped, however, that intensive discussion of such theories will help reduce the scarcity. In what follows I want to contribute to this end by briefly discussing two of the theories.
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988Intuitions: Their nature and epistemic efficacyGrazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1): 51-67. 2007.This paper presents an account of intuitions, and a defense of their epistemic efficacy in general, and more specifically in philosophy, followed by replies in response to various objections.
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5Are There Two Grades of Knowledge?Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1): 113-130. 2003.
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265Sosa on propositional attitudes de dicto and de re: Rejoinder to HintikkaJournal of Philosophy 68 (16): 498-501. 1971.