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418A virtue epistemologyOxford University Press. 2007.Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment.
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7Ontological and conceptual relativity and the selfIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.This chapter takes up, in six sections, issues of realism and of ontological and conceptual relativity. Section 1 briefly lays out the kind of absolutist realism of interest in what follows. Section 2 considers arguments against ordinary commonsense entities such as bodies, and for the view that subjects enjoy a superior ontological position. No such argument is found persuasive. I find no good argument against ordinary bodies or other common-sense entities, nor any good argument that subjects e…Read more
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15Dreams and SkepticsPhilosophic Exchange 35 (1). 2005.This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.
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11Reliability andIn John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 369. 2002.
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1``Postscript to Proper Function and Virtue Epistemology"In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contempoary Epistemology, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 271-280. 1996.
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3Skepticism and the internal/external divideIn John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 145--57. 1999.
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639Value Matters in EpistemologyJournal of Philosophy 107 (4): 167-190. 2010.In what way is knowledge better than merely true belief? That is a problem posed in Plato’s Meno. A belief that falls short of knowledge seems thereby inferior. It is better to know than to get it wrong, of course, and also better than to get it right by luck rather than competence. But how can that be so, if a true belief will provide the same benefits? In order to get to Larissa you do not need to know the way. A true belief will get you there just as well. Is it really always better to know t…Read more
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20Consciousness of self and of the presentIn James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, Hackett. 1983.
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16Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (review)Review of Metaphysics 56 (3): 653-656. 2003.The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy was held in Boston in August 1998. Twice in this century has there been a philosophy world congress in the United States, both times in Boston. Congresses have long been held every five years, but mostly in France, Germany, Russia, England, and other European countries. Aside from the two in this country, only one had previously been held in the Americas, in Mexico. The organization responsible for holding such congresses is, and has long been, the Fede…Read more
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1287How to defeat opposition to MoorePhilosophical Perspectives 13 137-49. 1999.What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouem…Read more