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7Ontological and conceptual relativity and the selfIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.This chapter takes up, in six sections, issues of realism and of ontological and conceptual relativity. Section 1 briefly lays out the kind of absolutist realism of interest in what follows. Section 2 considers arguments against ordinary commonsense entities such as bodies, and for the view that subjects enjoy a superior ontological position. No such argument is found persuasive. I find no good argument against ordinary bodies or other common-sense entities, nor any good argument that subjects e…Read more
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15Dreams and SkepticsPhilosophic Exchange 35 (1). 2005.This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.
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1``Postscript to Proper Function and Virtue Epistemology"In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant in Contempoary Epistemology, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 271-280. 1996.
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6Sources and DeliverancesIn Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, . pp. 7--9. 2007.
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20Consciousness of self and of the presentIn James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, Hackett. 1983.
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16Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (review)Review of Metaphysics 56 (3): 653-656. 2003.The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy was held in Boston in August 1998. Twice in this century has there been a philosophy world congress in the United States, both times in Boston. Congresses have long been held every five years, but mostly in France, Germany, Russia, England, and other European countries. Aside from the two in this country, only one had previously been held in the Americas, in Mexico. The organization responsible for holding such congresses is, and has long been, the Fede…Read more
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55Virtue perspectivism: A response to Foley and FumertonPhilosophical Issues 5 29-50. 1994.I am grateful to both Richards, Foley and Fumerton, for the time and attention that they have given to my work. I have certainly learned from their excellent comments, just as I expected. Given the constraints, however, I must be selective in my response. First of all, I will aim to present my view of human knowledge in a broader context. Against this background I will then respond to several of the points they have made.
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1281How to defeat opposition to MoorePhilosophical Perspectives 13 137-49. 1999.What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouem…Read more