Sirkku Hellsten

This article discusses the connection between individualism, pluralism and the moral foundation of liberal democracy. It analyses whether the requirement of value pluralism promoted by liberal democracies leads inevitably to communitarian ethics, or whether the liberal and democratic values of autonomy, tolerance and equality are actually based on an objectivistic and teleological account of justice. The author argues that value‐neutral procedural and methodological individualism cannot support the liberal demands for pluralism and tolerance in a democratic regime. Instead, the justification of liberal democracy has to replace mechanical, methodological individualism with moral individualism. Moral individualism shows that in order to be legitimate and functioning liberal democracy has to be based on the form of individualism which contains objectivist moral aspects.

This article discusses the problems that a liberal, multicultural democracy has in dealing with cultural practices, such as female circumcision, which themselves suppress the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism. In this context I have chosen the justification of female circumcision as my issue for three reasons. First, with increasing immigration, in Western multicultural and pluralistic societies this practice has recently been given a good deal of public attention; second, I believe that it is time to put this cruel and discriminatory tradition finally in the past; and third, the paradox that the victims of this practice are also often its strongest proponents well demonstrates the problems that liberal democracies have in dealing with the question of autonomy and tolerance in real‐life situations. My main argument is that, without giving up tolerance, we can show that there can be no moral justification for such a tradition as female circumcision, even within a multicultural and pluralist society. I shall first show why neither female circumcision nor any other tradition that oppresses and harms individuals and is maintained by coercion can be satisfactorily defended by liberal arguments. Then I shall discuss why ‘communitarian’counter‐arguments which appeal to the significance of communal values and traditions or to cultural rights also fail to give any plausible support to the maintenance of this tradition. Finally, I shall consider in more detail how the value of autonomy should be normatively understood in a modern pluralist society [1].

This paper examines the problems that various contemporary human rights discourses face with relativism, with special reference to the global protection of women’s rights. These problems are set within the theoretical debate between the Western liberal individualism on the one hand, and African, Asian and Islamic collectivist communitarianism on the other. Instead of trying to prove the superiority of one theoretical approach over the other, the purpose here is to point out some of the most common logical fallacies and cultural biases that have led to false polarizations between the various theoretical foundations of human rights discourse. The paper highlights these errors and inaccuracies with a view to diminishing the dichotomies between the various philosophical foundations of human rights, particularly in connection to the promotion of women’s rights. This is done in order to pave the way for more open and impartial political, cultural and gender dialogue in the promotion of human rights both in theory and in practice

The book is an exploration of the medical, legal, moral and cultural aspects of the practice of circumcision. The title suggests that the book will cover both topics, male and female circumcision. This, however, is misleading. The main focus of this collection is on male circumcision. This is problematic because the fact that female circumcision is left with much less attention means the reader may get the false impression that the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) is not very widely spread or has less serious consequences than male circumcision. In reality, however, FGM is still extensively practised in different parts of the world and due to its radical nature its physical, mental and social effects are usually even more devastating than those of male circumcision. This important fact is undermined in the very first chapter of the book, in which the trauma of male circumcision is emphasised by the claim that the differences between …

I examine some of the main philosophical, conceptual and normative issues in Colleen Murphy’s recent book The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice (2017). I am sceptical whether we need yet another theory of justice to fit particular ‘transitional circumstances’, as Murphy argues. Instead, before presenting an alternative normative, ‘moral’ theory, we need to re-examine the very concept of transitional justice. I examine particularly the following. Firstly, what we really mean by ‘transitional justice’ in various contexts; and I argue that transitional justice is not, as Murphy argues, ‘a special kind of justice’ needed during certain periods of political and social change. Transitional justice is rather an escape route from difficult questions of justice that transitional societies must deal with to maintain the delicate balance between justice and peace. Currently, the concept of transitional justice refers most directly to the overarching and expanding ‘toolkit’ of various mechanisms and processes used in post-conflict reconstruction. It is not quite clear how this toolkit fits with current debates on global, international, regional and local justice. Indeed, I would have preferred that Murphy focus on the complex conceptual foundations of transitional justice, rather than build a theory that conceptually and foundationally remains complex and ambiguous.

The article argues that the currently dominating, Western-originated individualistic and materialistic concept of development as ‘progress’ has created an evident confusion between ‘values and facts,’ ‘ideologies/ideals and practices,’ ‘ends and means’ in the current development thinking and practice. Instead of realizing such humanistic ideas as human flourishing and holistic well-being, current development agenda focuses on economic growth and producing ‘better business environments.’ Since this model for development has gradually been globalized, any alternative patters of conceptualizing development and setting alternative ideals for it have efficiently been disparaged. However, if we take the unsustainability of this model seriously and care for the survival of human kind, we need to look for new and alternative directions for development. In this we can learn from the developmental values of other cultures. This article introduces some exploratory thoughts on what African philosophy could offer to the debate on global development.

This article discusses the problems that a liberal, multicultural democracy has in dealing with cultural practices, such as female circumcision, which themselves suppress the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism. In this context I have chosen the justification of female circumcision as my issue for three reasons. First, with increasing immigration, in Western multicultural and pluralistic societies this practice has recently been given a good deal of public attention; second, I believe that it is time to put this cruel and discriminatory tradition finally in the past; and third, the paradox that the victims of this practice are also often its strongest proponents well demonstrates the problems that liberal democracies have in dealing with the question of autonomy and tolerance in real‐life situations. My main argument is that, without giving up tolerance, we can show that there can be no moral justification for such a tradition as female circumcision, even within a multicultural and pluralist society. I shall first show why neither female circumcision nor any other tradition that oppresses and harms individuals and is maintained by coercion can be satisfactorily defended by liberal arguments. Then I shall discuss why ‘communitarian’counter‐arguments which appeal to the significance of communal values and traditions or to cultural rights also fail to give any plausible support to the maintenance of this tradition. Finally, I shall consider in more detail how the value of autonomy should be normatively understood in a modern pluralist society [1].

The article discusses how theory and practice in global ethics affect each other. First, the author explores how the study of ethics has changed in the era of globalization and ponders what the role of the field of study of global ethics is in this context. Second, she wants to show how the logical fallacies in widening study field of ethics produce false polarizations between facts and value judgements in social ethics made in various cultural contexts. She further elaborates how these false polarizations prevent constructive cross-cultural and transnational discussions on ethical guidelines and principles that are needed to produce joint action to deal with serious ethical issues globally and nationally. Finally, the paper argues that in order to find a way to solve our shared complex ethical problems in global context, we need to get back to basics by focusing on the method of ethics, that is, self-critical and logical analysis of sound argumentation and justification of our values and moral pr..

Abstract:This article examines the relationship between philosophy and culture in global bioethics. First, it studies what is meant by the term “global” in global bioethics. Second, the author introduces four different types, or recognizable trends, in philosophical inquiry in bioethics today. The main argument is that, in order to make better sense of the complexity of the ethical questions and challenges we face today across the globe, we need to embrace the universal nature of self-critical and analytical philosophical analysis and argumentation, rather than using seemingly philosophical approaches to give unjustified normative emphasis on different cultural approaches to bioethics.

This article discusses the connection between individualism, pluralism and the moral foundation of liberal democracy. It analyses whether the requirement of value pluralism promoted by liberal democracies leads inevitably to communitarian ethics, or whether the liberal and democratic values of autonomy, tolerance and equality are actually based on an objectivistic and teleological account of justice. The author argues that value‐neutral procedural and methodological individualism cannot support the liberal demands for pluralism and tolerance in a democratic regime. Instead, the justification of liberal democracy has to replace mechanical, methodological individualism with moral individualism. Moral individualism shows that in order to be legitimate and functioning liberal democracy has to be based on the form of individualism which contains objectivist moral aspects.

In this article we discuss whether it pays to invest ethically. Our aim is to examine corporate social responsibility from philosophical, moral and practical points of views. We focus on two main issues related to ethical investments. Firstly we discuss the moral dilemma of how capitalism has changed its shape in today’s world and from ‘blaming the business’ there is a general attempt to use the markets to promote ethics values and corporate social responsibility. Secondly, we analyze the growth of ethical investment funds in the UK today, and their performance, and highlight some of the institutional investors involved in the management of ethical funds. We discuss whether ethical investments really succeed in reducing the conflict between profit-making and social responsibility as they promise or whether they use commercial rhetoric and market mechanism to merely sell us our own perceived values back. We conclude that the paper has a key contribution in setting the scene for future research in an area that is evolving and of fundamental importance to companies, investors and various stakeholder groups.

This article examines bioethics in Tanzania, particularly in relation to the HIV/AIDS epidemic for the following reasons: First, not only is HIV/AIDS the most alarming health problem in most parts of Africa, but the complexity of issues involved in medical and research ethics clearly illustrates the various levels of problems that bioethics—more precisely, both professional medical ethics and research ethics—faces in a poor, developing country. The article defends uniformity in the general, international bioethical guidelines but calls for wider discussion in their applicability in different economic and social conditions by claiming that in the present debates the issues of distributive justice, culture, and individual professional judgment have been tangled together in a manner that tends to justify double standards in practice. To avoid this confusion there is a need to find a more coherent approach to bioethics that brings together the normative requirements set by international guidelines, national policy planning, social ethics, and professional medical ethics. a