•  100
    What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1): 25-51. 2009.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its app…Read more
  •  30
    Expanding epistemology
    Social Epistemology 12 (3). 1998.
  •  98
    Morality without Moral Facts
    In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 6--220. 2006.
  • Reflections on the "paradox" of supererogation
    In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Moral obligation, Cambridge University Press. 2010.
  •  2
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. II (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
  •  177
    Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1 73-98. 2006.
  •  68
    Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology (edited book)
    with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons
    Oxford University Press. 1996.
    In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers s…Read more
  • McCarthy on Practical Necessitation in Kant
    Kant Studien 80 (2): 198-207. 1989.
  •  274
    Copping out on moral twin earth
    Synthese 124 (1-2): 139-152. 2000.
    In "Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth", David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist.
  •  22
    Ideal Code, Real World (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1): 240-244. 2004.
    In Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker attempts to breathe new life into rule-consequentialism, a view which, particularly in its utilitarian guise, was intensively explored in the 1950s and 1960s. But as Hooker points out, as the problems with the view compounded, it became generally thought of as a ‘tried and untrue’ approach to moral theory. It is commonly believed for instance that any coherent version of R-C, when fully fleshed out, will be extensionally equivalent to its act-consequentiali…Read more
  •  1250
    Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics
    In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuck fur Recht und Ethik (Annual for Law and Ethics), Duncker Und Humblot. 1994.
    An examination of Kant's doctrine of radical evil as set forth in Book I of Religion.
  •  554
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relation…Read more
  •  94
    Disputed moral issues: a reader (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
  •  278
    Moral phenomenology and moral theory
    Philosophical Issues 15 (1). 2005.
  •  219
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic
    Philosophical Papers 29 (2): 121-153. 2000.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual s…Read more
  •  11
    Oxford Studies Normative Ethics, Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2014.
    OSNE is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
  •  5
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 5 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2015.
    Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
  •  52
    Editor's Introduction
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 7-7. 2003.
  •  19
    Editors' Introduction
    with Nelson Potter
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1). 1998.