Mark Timmons

In the general introduction to the _Metaphysics of Morals_ where Kant discusses the concept of obligation and its law, he remarks that “the simplicity of this law in comparison with the great and various consequences that can be drawn from it must seem astonishing at first…” (_MS_ 6: 225). In the _Doctrine of Virtue_, Kant sets forth a system of duties to oneself and to others in which he appears to derive them from the humanity formulation of the CI, thus illustrating the “great and various consequences” that follow from the moral law. Smit and Timmons understand Kant’s derivations in the _Doctrine of Virtue_ as purporting not only to justify in the sense of proving or showing true various claims about the deontic status of various types of actions and associated attitudes, but they view the derivations as also purporting _explain_ why the various actions and attitudes have the deontic status Kant claims they have. The aim of their contribution is to (1) provide an interpretation of the humanity formulation which, they argue, is rich in content, and then (2) examine the various derivations featured in the _Doctrine of Virtue_ in order to evaluate their success in providing plausible explanations of the various duties to self and duties to others Kant discusses.

Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realist program seeks to accommodate the deeply embedded assumptions of commonsense morality, one of which is the thought that one’s current moral conviction on some topic might be mistaken. Some errors in moral belief are due to mistaken (non-moral) factual beliefs, which present no particular challenge to the moral quasi-realist. More worrisome is the thought that one may be mistaken at the level of one’s current moral standards. The challenge of making sense of first-person affirmations of the possibility of deep moral error represents a hard challenge to the quasi-realist. Although Blackburn has addressed the issue of deep moral error, this chapter aims to offer a more detailed irrealist expressivist treatment of moral error than has hitherto been offered by Blackburn or by other expressivists. This will advance the cause of quasi-realism and that of moral expressivism generally.

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This sixth volume brings together twelve new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in this field, including: the nature and morality of character, moral evil, the wrongness of promising, forms of utilitarianism, value and reasons, ethical explanation, moral overridingness, love, and moral reasoning.

This chapter examines a range of cases in which it appears one’s rights against harm are violated by another’s behaviour, even though this behaviour has done one no harm. These cases raise a serious problem for most theories of rights, though the problem is most pronounced on the Interest Theory of Rights. According to that theory, rights necessarily protect their holder’s wellbeing. At first glance, one might think that the person’s wellbeing cannot be said to be protected by the right in cases of harmless wronging because they are not harmed in such cases—so, the necessary condition set for the ascription of a right is not satisfied. This paper puts forward a novel solution to this problem, the Safety Condition. The Safety Condition looks beyond what happens in the actual world to close worlds in order that individuals’ wellbeing is robustly protected across circumstances that could just have easily come about.

Morality Without Foundations investigates fundamental metaethical questions about the meaning, truth, and justification of moral thought and discourse. Mark Timmons maintains that all versions of descriptivism in ethics, particularly certain accounts of moral realism, fail. He argues instead that a correct metaethical theory should embrace some version of non-descriptivism. Timmons defends what he calls "assertoric non-descriptivism" which, unlike traditional non-descriptivist views, holds that moral sentences are typically used to make genuine assertions. In defending this view, he exploits contextual semantics, providing him with the semantic flexibility to develop an irrealist account of moral discourse. Timmons goes on to support a contextualist moral epistemology, completing his overall version of contextualism in ethics. Like his foundationalist rivals, Timmons recognizes that there are moral beliefs that are epistemically basic in providing a basis for the justification of non-basic moral beliefs. Yet, he agrees with the coherentist in maintaining that there are no intrinsically justified beliefs that can serve as a single foundation for a system of moral knowledge. Timmons ultimately finds that regresses of justification of moral belief end with contextually basic beliefs--moral beliefs which, in the relevant context, are responsibly held, but in other contexts might not be suitable as regress stoppers. Timmons' novel defense of morality without foundations offers provocative reading for philosophers working in the areas of ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. Yet, written with the student in mind, his lucid presentation of difficult ideas makes this book accessible to students and newcomers to the field of metaethics.

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This twelfth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: vices and self-valuation, harmless wrongdoing, solidarity in Kantian ethics, trust, forgiveness, and moral worth.

Ideal for courses in contemporary moral problems, applied ethics, and introduction to ethics, Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader, Fifth Edition, offers a unique pedagogical approach that bridges moral theory and applied ethics. Bringing together sixty-eight engaging articles, it also includes an accessible Moral Theory Primer (Chapter 1). Each selection is enhanced by a host of pedagogical features, including concise summaries, reader cues referring to pertinent moral theories, and reading and discussion questions. A "Quick Guide to Moral Theories" at the front of the book and an extensive glossary of key terms are also included. A "User's Guide," which follows the preface, shows instructors how they can integrate moral theories and applied ethics into their courses.