Thomas Aquinas’ thesis that emotions are “motions of the sensory appetitive power”, which
are controlled by the rational power, raises three fundamental problems. (1) How can this thesis be reconciled
with the assumption that emotions are to be ascribed to a person and not to a sensory power as an
inner agent? (2) How can emotions have a cognitive content if they are nothing but appetitive states?
(3) How is it to be explained that emotions are often not under rational control or that they even …
Read moreThomas Aquinas’ thesis that emotions are “motions of the sensory appetitive power”, which
are controlled by the rational power, raises three fundamental problems. (1) How can this thesis be reconciled
with the assumption that emotions are to be ascribed to a person and not to a sensory power as an
inner agent? (2) How can emotions have a cognitive content if they are nothing but appetitive states?
(3) How is it to be explained that emotions are often not under rational control or that they even have a
strong impact on so-called rational activities? All of these questions are discussed with respect to the
example of fear. This example shows that Aquinas defends a complex position which takes both the
cognitive dimension of emotions and the mutual relation between sensory and rational states into ac-
count.