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133How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s ProblemReview of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3): 449-481. 2011.A persistent methodological problem in primate social cognition research has been how to determine experimentally whether primates represent the internal goals of other agents or just the external goals of their actions. This is an instance of Daniel Povinelli’s more general challenge that no experimental protocol currently used in the field is capable of distinguishing genuine mindreading animals from their complementary behavior-reading counterparts. We argue that current methods used to test …Read more
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15Advancing the Debate Between Hot and FO Accounts of ConsciousnessJournal of Philosophical Research 28 23-44. 2003.David Rosenthal and Fred Dretske agree that creature consciousness should be used to give a reductive explanation of state consciousness. They disagree, however, over what type of creature consciousness will do the job. Rosenthal, defending a higher-order thought (HOT) account, argues that higher-order creature consciousness is what is needed. Dretske, defending a first-order (FO) account, argues that first-order creature consciousness is what is needed. I attempt to advance this debate by prese…Read more
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26Smoke and mirrors: Testing the scope of chimpanzees’ appearance–reality understandingCognition 150 (C): 53-67. 2016.
Brooklyn, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |