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21Animal ConsciousnessJournal of Philosophical Research 24 149-168. 1999.The question of the possibility of conscious experience in animals has had a rebirth recentIy in both philosophy and psychology. I argue that there is an account of consciousness that is perfectly consistent with many animals enjoying conscious experiences. In defending my thesis, I examine a recent account of consciousness by Peter Carruthers which denies animals conscious experiences. I argue that Carruthers’ account should be rejected on the grounds that it is unnecessarily complex, and that …Read more
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108Origins of ObjectivityPhilosophical Psychology 25 (5): 775-781. 2012.Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-7, Ahead of Print
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49Feigning introspective blindness for thoughtBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 153-154. 2009.I argue that the very reasons Carruthers gives for why the account should allow introspective access to perceptual/quasi-perceptual states, can be given for thought, as well. I also argue that we have good subjectively accessible grounds for the intuition in introspective thoughts, notwithstanding Carruthers' argument to the contrary and his attempt to explain the intuition away
Brooklyn, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |