•  9
    Recusal and bush V. Gore
    Law and Philosophy 21 (2): 221-248. 2002.
    No Abstract
  •  2
    Preventive War - What Is It Good For?
    In Henry Shue & David Rodin (eds.), Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification, Oxford University Press. 2007.
  •  4
    Promises which cannot be kept
    Philosophia 18 (4): 399-407. 1988.
  •  5
    Personality Disorders and Responsibility: Learning from Peay
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3): 245-248. 2011.
    People with personality disorders should be treated fairly. Potential crime victims should be protected. That much is uncontroversial. The hard questions ask what is fair, when is protection adequate, and how should we achieve fairness and protection together. Peay outlines five main hurdles that the law must jump to reach these goals. All five raise serious challenges. To begin to address these challenges, we must first clarify what a personality disorder is. The notion of a personality disorde…Read more
  •  20
    Pyrrhonian skepticism (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skep…Read more
  •  10
    Perspectives on Climate Change (edited book)
    with Richard B. Howarth
    Elsevier. 2005.
    Explores the interplay between science, economics, politics, and ethics in relation to climate change and the international community.
  •  4
    Précis of Moral Scepticisms
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 789-793. 2008.
  • Naturalism
    In Moral skepticisms, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    This chapter surveys traditional responses to the skeptical regress problem for justified moral belief. It looks at naturalism, which attempts to derive “ought” from “is” or, more precisely, to formulate a deductively valid argument from non-normative premises to a moral conclusion. An example from Nelson is discussed, and it is shown that this argument, though logically valid, cannot be used to solve the skeptical regress problem.
  • Normativism
    In Moral skepticisms, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    This chapter covers normativism, which attempts to derive moral conclusions from normative but non-moral premises. One version refers to moral explanations, another version includes contractarianism and contractualism, which justifies moral beliefs by reference to contractors who are rational, impartial, and/or reasonable. Neither version can solve the skeptical regress problem.
  •  7
    Nihilism and scepticism about moral obligations
    Utilitas 7 (2): 228-236. 1995.
    There are many disagreements about what people have moral obligations to do, but almost everyone believes that some people have some moral obligations. Moreover, there are some moral obligations in which almost everyone believes. For example, if I promise to give a talk at this conference, I have a moral obligation to do so. Of course, my obligation might be overridden. Moreover, even if my obligation were overridden, I would still have a moral obligation to give a talk at this conference
  •  28
    `Ought' conversationally implies `can'
    Philosophical Review 93 (2): 249-261. 1984.
  •  4
    Moral Psychology, Vol. 4 (edited book)
    MIT Press. 2014.
  •  359
    Moral Skepticism and Justification
    In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology, Oxford University Press. 1996.
  •  99
    Philosophers have discussed virtue and character since Socrates, but many traditional views have been challenged by recent findings in psychology and neuroscience. This fifth volume of Moral Psychology grows out of this new wave of interdisciplinary work on virtue, vice, and character. It offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate virtue and character and related issues in m…Read more
  •  25
    Moral skepticisms
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are tru…Read more
  •  14
    Morality without God?
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a ...
  •  42
    Moral Relativity and Intuitionism
    Philosophical Issues 12 (1): 305-328. 2002.
  •  13
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  14
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  4
    Philosophers and psychologists discuss new collaborative work in moral philosophy that draws on evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain scienc…Read more
  •  7
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  4
    Moral Psychology Vol. 2 (edited book)
    MIT Press. 2008.
  •  19
    For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together…Read more
  •  3
    Moral Knowledge New Readings (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 1996.
    In Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven newly written essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The first chapter, written by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong…Read more
  •  4
    Leading philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists address issues of moral responsibility and free will, drawing on new findings from empirical science.