-
355Begging the questionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2). 1999.No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a well-known and popular response to scepticism by G.…Read more
-
442Are moral judgments unified?Philosophical Psychology 27 (4): 451-474. 2014.Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not u…Read more
-
19Moral IntuitionsIn John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. pp. 246-272. 2010.
-
3A philosophical indrocuction to constitutional interpretationIn Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Susan J. Brison (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation, Westview Press. pp. 1-25. 1993.
-
5An empirical challenge to moral intuitionismIn Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism, . pp. 11--28. 2011.
-
74Mele's Effective Intentions: The power of conscious will (review)Philosophical Books 51 (3): 127-143. 2010.
-
84A light theory of colorPhilosophical Studies 110 (3): 267-284. 2002.Traditional theories locate color in primary qualities of objects, in dispositional properties of objects, in visual fields, or nowhere. In contrast, we argue that color is located in properties of light. More specifically, light is red iff there is a property P of the light that typically interacts with normal human perceivers to give the sensation of red. This is an error theory, because objects and visual fields that appear red are not really red, since they lack the properties that make ligh…Read more
-
215A contrastivist manifestoSocial Epistemology 22 (3). 2008.General contrastivism holds that all claims of reasons are relative to contrast classes. This approach applies to explanation (reasons why things happen), moral philosophy (reasons for action), and epistemology (reasons for belief), and it illuminates moral dilemmas, free will, and the grue paradox. In epistemology, contrast classes point toward an account of justified belief that is compatible with reliabilism and other externalisms. Contrast classes also provide a model for Pyrrhonian sceptici…Read more
-
5Abstract + concrete = paradoxIn Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
-
42Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4): 349-350. 2010.Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a continuum to explain how moral judgments influence intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask (1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3) how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant alternatives when applying such notions
-
92Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with CommentaryOxford University Press USA. 1996.Ideal for undergraduate courses in philosophy of law, this comprehensive anthology examines such topics as the concept of law, the dispute between natural law theorists and legal positivists, the relations between law and morality, criminal responsibility and legal punishment, the rights of the individual against the state, justice and equality, and legal evidence as compared with scientific evidence. The readings have been selected from both philosophy and law journals and include classic texts…Read more
-
78Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volitionConsciousness and Cognition 33 (C): 196-203. 2015.The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may…Read more
-
233Is Morality Unified? Evidence that Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and DisgustJournal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10): 3162-3180. 2011.Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment ofmoral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different m…Read more
-
788Responsibility for forgettingPhilosophical Studies 176 (5): 1177-1201. 2019.In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward p…Read more
-
150Intention, temporal order, and moral judgmentsMind and Language 23 (1). 2008.The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether a…Read more
-
224Modality, morality, and belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 1995.Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This 'state of the art' collection honours one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic…Read more
-
22God?:A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist: A Debate Between a Christian and an AtheistOxford University Press USA. 2004.The question of whether or not God exists is profoundly fascinating and important. Now two articulate spokesmen--one a Christian, the other an atheist--duel over God's existence in an illuminating battle of ideas. In God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong bring to the printed page two debates they held before live audiences, preserving all the wit, clarity, and immediacy of their public exchanges. Avoiding overly esoteric arguments, they…Read more
-
19Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2010.We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.
-
129Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet (edited book)Oup Usa. 2010.We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.
-
68Years of moral epistemology: A bibliographySouthern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1): 217-229. 1991.
-
98Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and FurniturePhilosophia 47 (1): 131-139. 2019.Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
-
127Moral reasoningIn John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. 2010.What is moral reasoning? For that matter, what is any sort of reasoning? Let me begin by making a few distinctions. First, there is a distinction between reasoning as something that that people do and the abstract structures of proof or “argument” that are the subject matter of formal logic. I will be mainly concerned with reasoning in the first sense, reasoning that people do. Second, there is a distinction between moral reasoning with other people and moral reasoning by and for yourself . Mora…Read more
-
319Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgmentsCognition 108 (2): 353-380. 2008.An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causati…Read more
Huckleberry Spring, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
4 more
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Neuroscience |
Psychology |
Areas of Interest
4 more
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Moral Psychology |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Neuroscience |
Psychology |