John Capps

This dissertation defends a contextualist theory of justification: I argue that the justification of our beliefs depends on the context in which those beliefs are held. By way of opposition, I maintain that moderate foundationalism and coherentism are mistaken in interesting ways, ways that indicate the necessary role of contextual factors. ;Contextualism is also open to criticism, however. The most serious is that contextualism is a version of perspectivism: justification is just a matter of perspective or, at most, social convention. To counter this charge I propose embedding contextualism within a modestly naturalized epistemology. Doing so, I argue, allows one to profit from the parallels between epistemology and science while accounting for the natural constraints on belief justification. ;I am careful to distinguish my version of naturalism from that of Quine and other naturalized epistemologists. Quine does not, first of all, explain the basis of our epistemic principles; moreover, his naturalism equivocates over whether epistemology is a normative or purely descriptive discipline. I criticize other naturalists for embracing reliabilism, scientific realism and reductivism. I argue that these additional commitments are both problematic and unnecessary: they make naturalism implausible while distorting the relationship between epistemology and science. ;I propose instead a pragmatic naturalism, drawing on John Dewey's theory of inquiry. Dewey's naturalism is based on the claim that epistemic principles emerge as inquiries proceed: while these principles are not a priori, neither are they merely conventional. Pragmatic naturalism, as a result, prevents the conflation of contextualism with perspectivism. In addition, I argue, a pragmatic naturalism treats epistemology as a fundamentally normative discipline, while avoiding the issues that lead to radical philosophical skepticism. ;The dissertation closes with three case-studies that illustrate the role of contextual factors in belief justification. These case studies show that a contextualist theory of justification, when embedded within a pragmatic naturalism, can account for how we do justify beliefs, as well as how we ought to

Donald Capps and John Capps's James and Dewey on Belief and Experience juxtaposes the key writings of two philosophical superstars. As fathers of Pragmatism, America's unique contribution to world philosophy, their work has been enormously influential, and remains essential to any understanding of American intellectual history. In these essays, you'll find William James deeply embroiled in debates between religion and science. Combining philosophical charity with logical clarity, he defended the validity of religious experience against crass forms of scientism. Dewey identified the myriad ways in which supernatural concerns distract religious adherents from pressing social concerns, and sought to reconcile the tensions inherent in science's dual embrace of common sense and the aesthetic. James and Dewey on Belief and Experience is divided into two sections: the former showcases James, the latter is devoted to Dewey. Two transitional passages in which each reflects on the work of the other bridge these two main segments. Together, the sections offer a unique perspective on the philosophers' complex relationship of influence and interdependence. An editors' introduction provides biographical information about both men, an overview of their respective philosophical orientations, a discussion of the editorial process, and a brief commentary on each of the selections. Comparing what these foremost pragmatists wrote on both themes illumines their common convictions regarding the nature of philosophical inquiry and simultaneously reveals what made each a distinctive thinker.

In his later years Frederick Will took a pragmatic approach to the justification of beliefs and norms. Here I trace the development of his pragmatism through his early ordinary language philosophy and subsequent antifoundationalism. I then compare his pragmatic naturalism with Dewey's instrumentalism: while both are pragmatists of the center (not so left-leaning as Rorty and James, for example), Will's realism places him to the right of Dewey. While Will's refreshingly aware that justification is a complex affair, I conclude that Dewey's "center-left" position provides more opportunity for assessing our epistemic norms philosophically