Alessandra Beccarisi

The volume aims to investigate one of the most layered and pivotal concepts in the philosophical tradition: reason, understood not only as an intellectual faculty but also as a historical force and organizing principle. The book stems from a shared intellectual project initiated at the conference held in Foggia in March 2023, later enriched by contributions developed within PRIN research programs, with the goal of expanding and deepening the inquiry into the theme. Adopting an interdisciplinary and intercultural lens, the volume gathers essays that explore the concept of reason across different philosophical contexts: from classical Greek thought to Christian and Islamic medieval philosophy, from Cartesian and Kantian modernity to contemporary critiques, including lesser-studied fields such as alchemical practices. The collection highlights both the faith in rationality as a driver of human progress and its historical contradictions, epistemological ambiguities, and ethical-political limitations. A central focus lies on the tension between reason and history: on one hand, reason as a guiding force in human development; on the other, history as a testing ground for its validity, as well as a domain of crisis and transformation. This dialectic permeates the volume, offering a multifaceted and critical understanding of a concept that remains central to the human condition.

According to modern categorizations, the commentaries on the Holy Scriptures by Albert the Great are not philosophical works and therefore they have received minimal attention in the field of Albertine studies. Super Matthaeum, for example, is one of the least studied in existing research. As a result, the complexity of the relationships between biblical interpretation and the philosophical and theological disciplines are surprising to the researcher used to seeing in Albert a kind of two-headed Janus – either the natural philosopher or the metaphysician, either the natural scientist or the theologian. Albert himself provided occasion for such a dichotomous view. He often held that theologica non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis. Nevertheless, some studies have already documented the clear presence of the “philosophical” Albert alongside Albert the “theologian” and “biblical interpreter.” The present contribution offers a particular case study by analyzing Albert’s exegesis of the words in somnis in his commentary on Matthew’s Gospel. This is a long passage in which the Dominican master makes extensive use of philosophical theories on divination through dreams, which he had already presented in De somno et vigilia. According to Albert’s exegesis, the visio prophetalis experienced by Joseph in Matthew’s Gospel is the same kind experienced by Socrates, the first prophet, and the natural philosopher described in De somno et vigilia.

This article presents a few research findings related to the Geomantia attributed to William of Moerbeke. It consists of three sections: The first provides evidence for the classification of the Geomantia within the genre of the medieval compilations. The second includes a comparison of the Geomantia with the Ars geomantie nova of Batholomew of Parma and a few considerations on the datation of the treatise attributed to Moerbeke, based on this assessment. The third brings to the attention of scholars an unpublished marginal note concerning the date of composition of the Geomantia.

In this paper, I offer an analysis of a passage from Eckhart’s commentary on the verse of the Genesis In principio creavit caelum et terram that has not received, in my opinion, sufficient attention so far. In this passage, Eckhart points out that the principium through which God created the world is the ideal model, i.e. the ratio essendi of a thing as well as its ratio cognoscendi. It is also the cause of the essence of the thing and, as Aristotle says, of its definition and its scientific proof. Eckhart also quotes Averroes, according to whom philosophers have always searched for the quiddity of a sensible thing because it could lead to knowledge of the first cause of being. By this, Eckhart warns, Averroes does not mean God, as some erroneously think, but the ratio idealis of sensible things, which is expressed by their definition. Joseph Koch’s critical edition does not identify who the plerique erra...

In der Eckhartforschung stand der Begriff isticheit nie zur Debatte: von Denifle bis Alain de Libera zeigen sich alle Forscher einstimmig überzeugt, daß das Lexem isticheit als Substantivierung des Verbs ist aufzufassen ist und daß es sich dabei um einen von Eckhart geprägten Neologismus handelt, der das Sein Gottes bezeichnen soll. Wer jedoch die nicht sehr zahlreichen bisher dazu geschriebenen Seiten durchblättert, muß stutzig werden. Die allgemeine Harmonie der Meinungen verwandelt sich plötzlich in Mißtöne, wenn es an die Übersetzung dieses Begriffs geht, dem jeder Gelehrte, oft in Bezug auf ein und dieselbe Textstelle Eckharts, unterschiedliche Bedeutungen zuweist: subsistentia, esse purum, esse existentiae, natura, essentia oder ipsum esse. In jedem von diesen Fällen handelt es sich um einen längst kodifizierten Fachbegriff des theologischen und philosophischen Lateins, für den es auch im Mittelhochdeutschen eine mehr oder weniger genaue Entsprechung gab: wesen, blôze und lûter wesen, natûre, substancie, understân usw. Und doch machte sich Eckhart die Mühe eine alternative Terminologie zu entwickeln. Warum? Auf diese Frage, die übrigens von der Kritik völlig vernachlässigt wurde, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit eine Antwort zu geben. Dabei stütze ich mich auf einige bisher weniger untersuchte Stellen des deutschen Werks Meister Eckharts und versuche eine Alternative zu den in der Forschung kursierenden Deutungen, die ich im ersten Teil meiner Arbeit besprechen werde, zu entwickeln.