Timothy Tambassi

The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better account for the open future problem, our cognitive attitudes towards future contingents, and how open the future is. Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker disagrees with them, stating that the advantages suggested by IFT's supporters are not advantages at all and/or can be accommodated by GBT. This means that, if he is right, there is no reason to prefer IFT over GBT. However, if we prove the feasibility of (at least) one of the supposed advantages of IFT, Longenecker should admit that the game between IFT and GBT could still be open. Here, we focus on our cognitive attitudes towards future, with the aim of showing that the explanation of such attitudes may be a string to IFT's bow, as Ross Cameron suggests.

According to Gamper (Sci Ontol Axiomathes 29:99–102, 2019), one function of science is to determine how the world is. Science, Gamper continues, rests on a set of basic assumptions, and the gap between basic assumptions and science should be filled by ontological frameworks that accommodates the modal properties of such assumptions. Different frameworks may surely suggest different modal properties. Thus, in so far as we use different basic assumptions, we can have different ontologies with different modal properties. Ontologies affect, in turn, science, which, however, has the power to falsify the ontological frameworks. The aim of this article is to show a possible trouble of Gamper's proposal, here considered as applied to the geographical debate.

This article intends to provide an overview on the philosophical and geographical background of geo-ontologies and to propose a geographical classification of these ontologies, in response to their increasing diffusion within the contemporary debate. Accordingly, the first two paragraphs are devoted to offer a short introduction to the ontological turn in philosophy and to the development of the ontology of geography, that is that part of the (philosophical) ontology mainly focused on geographic entities and their boundaries, spatial representation, meretopological relations and location. As a second step, this preliminary analysis is taken to be a helpful device in showing some philosophical tools useful for geo-ontologies and in determining whether and what geographical sub-areas can be identified from non-professional geographers. Consequently, paragraphs three and four investigate the emerging of geo-ontologies from the spatial turn and their general aims. Part of this inquiry is dedicated to show some taxonomies derived from the domain of computer and information science and to underline the absence of a classification suitable for spreading geo-ontologies in the geographical debate. As it is, the fifth paragraph is concerned with a taxonomy for geo-ontologies grounded on some fundamental geographical distinctions. The basic idea is that such a taxonomy might best introduce geo-ontologies to the geographical debate that, in turn, might deeply influence the advancement of these ontologies in terms of conceptualizations and trace gradually the guidelines for a classification, in which the development of geo-ontologies would follow all the different sub-disciplines within the same geography.

In Ontological Tools for GeographicRepresentationsgeographic, Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Achille Varzi have formalized and introduced the (geo-ontological) distinction between Geographyclassical and nonclassical Geographynonclassical. Although that distinction makes no essential reference to maps, the authors have pointed out that the dichotomy can be useful to specify the kind of geography that is implied in the spatial Representationsspatial. Thus, the aim of this paper is to showcase the main assumptions behind the distinction between Geographyclassical and nonclassical geography and to present some possible issues arising from its application to cartographic Representationscartographic. Accordingly, the first two sections offer a short introduction to the scopes of the ontology of Ontologyof geography, and to the main theoretical Toolstheoretical needed for advancing a (formal) theory of spatial Representationsspatial. The third section shows some issues emerging from the application of the distinction between classical and Geographynonclassical geographies to the cartographic Representationscartographic, by discussing (and expanding) the list of examples provided by the three authors.

The chapter is devoted to offer a short introduction to computational ontologies and the ontological turn in philosophy. It also includes the advancement of the ontology of geography, that is that part of the (philosophical) ontology mainly focused on (1) establishing what kinds of geographical entities exist, (2) developing a theory of spatial representation, and (3) arguing how the geographic descriptions of reality emerging from common sense can be combined with descriptions derived from scientific disciplines. As a second step, this preliminary analysis is taken to provide a helpful device in showing the importance of geographical common sense conceptualizations and in defining how non-expert subjects conceptualize geospatial phenomena in response to a series of different geographical phrased elicitations.

The main task of this article is providing a sketch of possible approaches, response attempts, conundrums and issues arising from the question: ‘What is a Entitiesgeographical entity?’. It is shown how trying to answer this question is made particularly difficult by a multiplicity of aspects that might be summarized as follows: (1) There exist Conceptualizationsmultiple conceptualizations of the geographical Worldgeographical. (2) Different Languages and Cultures may slice such a world in different ways. (3) The geographical Worldgeographical has changed and will change over Time. (4) Also geography (as a discipline) has changed and will change over Time, modifying its perspective, tools, Domains of investigation and aims. Consequently, what had, has been, will be considered as non-geographic could be considered as geographic and vice versa. (5) There were, are and will be different kinds of geographies as well as different geographical branches, each of them had, have and might have different tools, aims, Points of Views and vocabularies. (6) The introduction of new scholarly Fields and new Technologies, the birth of intellectual movements or Paradigms shifts and developments on other disciplinary contexts can/will influence geography as a discipline.

Given that part of the first chapter is devoted to describe ontology of geography with knowledge elicitation techniques, this chapter is more speculative, in the sense of defining notions such as geographical entities and boundaries, and tracing some philosophical tools useful for spatial representation. Regarding the first point, I point out that a criterion for the individuation of a geographical entity can also be the possession of boundaries, which give rise to a number of ontological conundrums and may themselves be difficult to individuate. Consequently, an analysis on (and a classification of) geographical boundaries might also be functional in order to determine what kinds of geographic entities exist and have to be included as fundamental. Regarding the spatial representation, I show that geo-ontological analysis has developed three main theoretical tools strictly interconnected and mutually interacting: mereology, topology and theory of spatial location.

The chapter investigates the emerging of geo-ontologies from the spatial turn (Sect 1) and their general aims. The Sect. 10.1007/978-3-319-64033-4_1 of this inquiry is dedicated to show some taxonomies derived from the domain of information science and to underline the absence of a classification suitable for spreading geo-ontologies in the geographical debate. The Sect. 10.1007/978-3-319-64033-4_2 is concerned with a taxonomy for geo-ontologies grounded on some fundamental geographical distinctions. The basic idea is that such a taxonomy might best introduce geo-ontologies to the geographical debate that, in turn, might deeply influence the advancement of these ontologies in terms of conceptualizations and trace gradually the guidelines for a classification, in which the development of geo-ontologies would follow all the different sub-disciplines within the same geography.

This chapter presents the emergence of Digital Humanities and the consequent proliferation of geographical projects focused on the ancient world, in particular Greek and Roman. Despite geo-ontologies do not represent, at least, not yet, a recurring tool for these projects, I try to imagine some of the main problems that an ontology aimed at describing the ancient world would face. In order to do this the analysis will start with a sketch on the scopes of the ancient geography and, then, it will consider more specific methodological and representational issues.

This paper investigates how the use of different rules for making inferences affects our understanding of what certain Extensible Markup Language (XML) documents do not represent. The aim is to show that we can infer different, contrasting things from the same XML documents, thereby weakening the communication that XML is supposed to support. There are three main reasons why the paper focuses on XML. First, XML, as a metalanguage, has no inherent rules for making inferences, but it also has no constraints on the technologies, systems, or theories that support or define the rules that can be used in conjunction with it. Second, XML is still widely used, and there are many other markup languages based on XML. This means that the critical analysis of these pages is, in principle, extendable to contexts where XML is involved and/or the rules for making inferences are not inherently supported. Third, since XML is explicitly intended to support communication between people, between software applications, and between people and software applications, this analysis may also shed new light on some of the theoretical assumptions behind such communication.

Both Extensible Markup Language [XML] and Formal Ontologies [ISOs] have something to do with partitioning. XML partitions data using elements. FOs partition domains using representational primitives. On the basis of the partitioning of FOs, the philosophical debate has outlined an epistemological view about FOs, namely perspectivism. For perspectivism, partitioning a domain means making a mental distinction between those entities on which we focus and those that fall outside our interest. This partitioning provides a perspective on the domain. In Tambassi (2023) it has been argued that perspectivism is an underlying assumption of FOs. In this paper, I investigate whether the same is true of XML: that is, whether and how XML is perspectivist. I begin by defining FOs and presenting the main claims of perspectivism in order to discuss how these claims apply to FOs. Then I move on to XML, showing both the perspectivism of XML and how the claims apply to XML. The purpose is therefore purely speculative. Discussing whether XML is committed to perspectivism may help to clarify some of the theoretical assumptions of this markup metalanguage. More generally, the idea is that since the creators of markup languages develop these languages under the guidance of some theoretical assumptions, for the sake of methodological accuracy these assumptions should be subjected to critical analysis rather than remain implicit and unexamined.

Although many information system ontologies (ISOs) claim to be parsimonious, the notion of parsimony seems to influence the debate on ISOs only at the level of vague and uncritical assumption. To challenge this trend, the paper aims to clarify what it means for ISOs to be parsimonious. Specifically, section 2 shows that parsimony in computer science generally concerns software design and, together with elegance, is one of the two aspects of the broader notion of simplicity. Section 3 transforms the main claims of parsimony in software design into claims about the content of ISOs, the combination of which is hereafter called “parsimony of content”—where “content” refers only to the content of ISOs. Sections 4-7 discuss the application of this parsimony to the design of ISOs, and outline different kinds (and combinations) of parsimony of content. Finally, section 8 considers whether parsimony of content could provide some criteria both for selecting and/or classifying the contents of ISOs and for choosing between different and equally consistent ISOs.

Insofar as disagreement may in principle regard most of (maybe all) facets of information system ontologies’ [ISOs] debate, it may also produce a plurality of views – sometimes inconsistent with each other – on ISOs’ development and design. This paper analyzes a view that makes the recognition of – and provides a theoretical foundation for – such a plurality of views a trademark: perspectivism (on ISOs). The aim is to show what exactly endorsing perspectivism consists of, and how perspectivism differs from different, competing views. Section 2 introduces the main claims of perspectivism, and remarks that perspectivism mainly deals with ISOs’ development and design. As for ISOs’ development, Sect. 3 considers domain’s partition and systematization, by distinguishing perspectivism from realism and relativism. Section 3 also shows that perspectivism implies some sort of variantism on ISOs’ representational primitives, about which perspectivism may not differ from its rivals. As for the ISOs’ design, Sect. 4 points out that despite perspectivism grants the possibility to use any procedural approach, principle, and ontological language, it is not committed to uphold that all those approaches, principles, and languages are legitimate. Finally, Sect. 5 focuses on both perspectivism’s weaknesses and (theoretical) contribution to ISOs’ debate.

L'articolo discute il modo in cui la distinzione di Rudolf Carnap tra questioni interne ed esterne possa essere estesa e applicata alla teoria sociale. Seguendo Carnap si sostiene come, dato un sistema di riferimento, una questione č interna se valutata e risolta all'interno del sistema in questione, mentre č esterna se mette in discussione il sistema di riferimento dato e lo stato di cose che presuppone. Quindi, attraverso un'analisi incentrata principalmente sul sistema di riferimento ‘la Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana' e sul tema della giustizia, si discutono la rilevanza e le conseguenze di tale distinzione per la teoria sociale.

The growing diffusion of perspectivism within the debate on information system ontologies [ISOs] does not correspond to a thorough analysis of what perspectivism specifically consists of. This paper aims to fill this void. First, I show what supporting perspectivism in information system ontologies [PISO] means in terms of (minimal) claims and implications; then I argue that the definitions of ISO implicitly assume PISO’s (minimal) claims or, in other words, that ISOs presuppose and maintain PISO. Section 2 presents the main definitions of ISO. Section 3 specifies what claims are common to all perspectivists in ISO. Sects. 4–7 analyze the implications of those claims. Section 8 explores the chance of multiple perspectivisms within ISOs’ domain. Finally, Sects. 9–10 assume that, if PISO’s (minimal) claims and (their) implications can be inferred from ISO’s definitions, then ISOs are perspectivist, or PISO’s minimal claims are assumptions underlying ISOs.

The current (still limited) use of the notion of informativeness in the domain of information system ontologies seems to indicate that such ontologies are informative if and only if they are understandable for their final recipients. This paper aims at discussing some theoretical issues emerging from that use which, as we will see, connects the informativeness of information system ontologies to their representational primitives, domains of knowledge, and final recipients. Firstly, we maintain that informativeness interacts not only with the actual representational primitives, but also with their variability over time. Secondly, we discuss the correspondence between representational primitives and domains of knowledge of those ontologies. Finally, we explore the possibility of an epistemological discrepancy between human beings and software systems on the understanding of ontological contents.

This article might be interpreted as a theoretical journey in the realm of geographical investigation aimed at specifying the kinds of entities that such an investigation presupposes. Indeed, the purpose of these pages is to sketch what could be included in a geographical universal catalogue of all geographical entities there were, there are and (maybe) there will be. The starting point is Marcello Tanca’s thesis that geography presumes a hybrid ontology, grounded – at least – on three different joints of the geographical investigation: things, representations and practices. Speaking about geographical things, we discuss the famous distinction between bona fide and fiat boundaries, proposed by Barry Smith. When we apply such a dichotomy to the (corresponding) bounded entities, we see that the distinction shows some ambiguities, which could make us question the existence of proper bona fide entities. Then, the topic of geographical representation is taken by the horns. Firstly, we introduce the notion of cartographical entity, which subsumes everything that could be portrayed on maps. Secondly, we address the possibility of a cartographical catalogue, suitable for including all cartographical entities. Thirdly, we apply the first two steps to the notions of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and geo-ontological entity. Finally, in the conclusion, we consider whether and how these (cartographical, GIS and geo-ontological) catalogues could enrich our geographical universal catalogue.

According to ontological perspectivism, there can be, in principle, multiple and alternative perspectives on the world that can be sliced, systematized, and conceptualized in different ways. Surely, such an ontological position has many categorial implications, which may vary depending on different disciplinary contexts. This paper explores parts of these implications in the realm of geography. In particular, it aims at discussing the ontological categories that one might use to describe the geographical world in an overarching perspective – that is, the perspective that puts toether all the partial views coming from the different branches of the geographical investigation. We will see that if the overarching perspective is expected to include all the views on the geographical world, then such a perspective should be all-embracing in terms of contents and categories. This means that the overarching perspective might also comprehend inconsistencies that derive from how the various partial perspectives conceptualize differently the geographical world.

The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better account for the open future problem, our cognitive attitudes towards future contingents, and how open the future is. Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker disagrees with them, stating that the advantages suggested by IFT's supporters are not advantages at all and/or can be accommodated by GBT. This means that, if he is right, there is no reason to prefer IFT over GBT. However, if we prove the feasibility of one of the supposed advantages of IFT, Longenecker should admit that the game between IFT and GBT could still be open. Here, we focus on our cognitive attitudes towards future, with the aim of showing that the explanation of such attitudes may be a string to IFT's bow, as Ross Cameron suggests.

According to Gamper, one function of science is to determine how the world is. Science, Gamper continues, rests on a set of basic assumptions, and the gap between basic assumptions and science should be filled by ontological frameworks that accommodates the modal properties of such assumptions. Different frameworks may surely suggest different modal properties. Thus, in so far as we use different basic assumptions, we can have different ontologies with different modal properties. Ontologies affect, in turn, science, which, however, has the power to falsify the ontological frameworks. The aim of this article is to show a possible trouble of Gamper's proposal, here considered as applied to the geographical debate.

This book is intended as a philosophical introduction to geo-ontologies, in response to their increasing diffusion within the contemporary debate, where philosophy plays a fundamental, though still unexplored, role. Accordingly, the first part offers a short overview of the ontological background of geo-ontologies, which comprehends computer science, philosophy and geography. The second part is devoted to describe the ontology of geography, to define notions such as geographical entities and boundaries, and to trace some philosophical tools useful for spatial representation. The third part investigates the emerging of geo-ontologies from the spatial turn and is concerned with a taxonomy for geo-ontologies grounded on some fundamental geographical distinctions. Finally, the last part presents the emergence of Digital Humanities and the consequent proliferation of geographical projects focused on the ancient world, in particular Greek and Roman.