-
84Lamps, cubes, balls and walls: Zeno problems and solutionsPhilosophical Studies 150 (1). 2010.Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by A…Read more
-
25Probabilistic Justification and the Regress ProblemStudia Logica 83 (3): 333-341. 2008.We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
-
Nemen gedane zaken geen keer?: Opmerkingen over spijtAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 96 (2). 2004.
-
137On poor and not so poor thought experiments. A reply to Daniel CohnitzJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1). 2007.We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and rôle of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz raises, but rather to restrict ourselves …Read more
-
40Lamps, cubes, balls and walls: Zeno problems and solutionsPhilosophical Studies 150 (1): 49-59. 2010.Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf’s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by A…Read more
-
83Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemologySynthese 191 (4): 627-628. 2014.
-
105Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and FallaciesSynthese 184 (1): 1-1. 2012.
-
11Is What 'Is Done Done? O_n Regret and Remorse'Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4): 219-226. 2005.Often, regret implies the wish not to have performed certain actions. In this article I claim that this wish can to some extent be fulfilled: it is possible, in a sense, to influence the character of actions that have already been performed. This possibility arises from combining a first person perspective with an outlook on actions as expressions of tendencies, where tendencies are identified on the basis of a number of actions. The idea is specified within the framework of Carnapian reduction …Read more
-
55Ineffectual Foundations: Reply to Gwiazda: DiscussionsMind 119 (476): 1125-1133. 2010.In an earlier paper I argued that there are cases in which an infinite probabilistic chain can be completed. According to Jeremy Gwiazda, however, I have merely shown that the chain in question can be computed, not that it can be completed. Gwiazda thereby discriminates between two terms that I used as synonyms. In the present paper I discuss to what extent computability and completability can be meaningfully distinguished.
-
169Infinitism RegainedMind 116 (463): 597-602. 2007.Consider the following process of epistemic justification: proposition $E_{0}$ is made probable by $E_{1}$ which in turn is made probable by $E_{2}$ , which is made probable by $E_{3}$ , and so on. Can this process go on indefinitely? Foundationalists, coherentists, and sceptics claim that it cannot. I argue that it can: there are many infinite regresses of probabilistic reasoning that can be completed. This leads to a new form of epistemic infinitism
-
24IntroductionMetaphilosophy 45 (2): 139-145. 2014.This introduction presents selected proceedings of a two-day meeting on the regress problem, sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and hosted by Vanderbilt University in October 2013, along with other submitted essays. Three forms of research on the regress problem are distinguished: metatheoretical, developmental, and critical work
-
De Kant-Interpretatie van Evert Willem BethAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 83 114-128. 1991.
-
10Formal Proof or Linguistic Process? Beth and Hintikka on Kant’s Use of ‘Analytic’Kant Studien 85 (2): 160-178. 1994.
-
140Grounds and limits: Reichenbach and foundationalist epistemologySynthese 181 (1). 2011.From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbac…Read more
-
54Are there mental entities? Some lessons from Hans ReichenbachSorites 11 (11): 66-81. 1999.The meaning of mental terms and the status of mental entities are core issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is argued that the old Reichenbachian distinction between abstracta and illata might shed new light on these issues. First, it suggests that beliefs, desires and other pro-attitudes that make up the higher mental life are not all equally substantial or real. Second, it conceives the elements of the lower mental life as entities that are inferred from concrete, observable events. A…Read more
-
641Achilles, the Tortoise, and Colliding BallsHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3). 2008.It is widely held that the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, introduced by Zeno of Elea around 460 B.C., was solved by mathematical advances in the nineteenth century. The techniques of Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor made it clear, according to this view, that Achilles’ difficulty in traversing an infinite number of intervals while trying to catch up with the tortoise does not involve a contradiction, let alone a logical absurdity. Yet ever since the nineteenth century there have been diss…Read more
-
55Biased Coins: A model for higher-order probabilitiesIn Maria Clara Galavotti, Elisabeth Nemeth & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), European Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Vienna Heritage, Springer. pp. 241-248. 2014.Is it coherent to speak of the probability of a probability, and the probability of a probability of a probability, and so on? We show that it is, in the sense that a regress of higher-order probabilities can lead to convergent sequences that determine all these probabilities. By constructing an implementable model which is based on coin-making machines, we demonstrate the consistency of our regress
-
4Classical, nonclassical and neoclassical intentionsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1): 217-233. 2005.Kuipers' model of action explanation is compared, first with that of Anscombe, and then with models in the post-Anscombian tradition. Whereas Kuipers and Anscombe differ on the question of the first-person view, the difference with post-Anscombian writers concerns the so-called intentional statement. Kuipers criticizes the models of both Hempel and von Wright for their lack of an intentional statement. Kuipers' own model seems immune to this criticism, since it contains no less than two intentio…Read more
-
63Akrasia, dispositions and degreesErkenntnis 53 (3): 285-308. 2000.It is argued that the recent revival of theakrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is adirect, albeit unforeseen result of the debate onaction explanation in the philosophy of science. Asolution of the problem is put forward that takesaccount of the intimate links between the problem ofakrasia and this debate. This solution is basedon the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees ofstrength, and it suggests a way of giving a precisemeaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out thatthe solu…Read more
-
Analytische en continentale filosofie: And never the twain shall meet?Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 90 (4): 245-261. 1998.
-
12Identity and Difference: A Hundred Years of Analytic PhilosophyMetaphilosophy 31 (4): 365-381. 2000.At its origins, analytic philosophy is an interest in language, science, logic, analysis, and a systematic rather than a historical approach to philosophical problems. Early analytic philosophers were famous for making clear conceptual distinctions and for couching them in comprehensible and lucid sentences. It is argued that this situation is changing, that analytic philosophy is turning into its mirror image and is thereby becoming more like the kind of philosophy that it used to oppose.
-
80An Endless Hierarchy of ProbabilitiesAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3): 267-276. 2012.Suppose q is some proposition, and let P(q) = v0 (1) be the proposition that the probability of q is v0.1 How can one know that (1) is true? One cannot know it for sure, for all that may be asserted is a further probabilistic statement like P(P(q) = v0) = v1, (2) which states that the probability that (1) is true is v1. But the claim (2) is also subject to some further statement of an even higher probability: P(P(P(q) = v0) = v1) = v2, (3) and so on. Thus, an infinite regress emerges of pr…Read more
-
101A case of confusing probability and confirmationSynthese 184 (1): 101-107. 2012.Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed
-
Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers. Volume 2 (edited book)Rodopi. 2005.This book is the second of two volumes devoted to the work of Theo Kuipers, a leading Dutch philosopher of science. Philosophers and scientists from all over the world, thirty seven in all, comment on Kuipers’ philosophy, and each of their commentaries is followed by a reply from Kuipers. The present volume is devoted to Kuipers’ neo-classical philosophy of science, as laid down in his Structures in Science . Kuipers defends a dialectical interaction between science and philosophy in that he vie…Read more
-
11IntroductionPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1): 11-20. 2005.
-
7Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation (edited book)Rodopi. 2005.This book is the first of two volumes devoted to the work of Theo Kuipers, a leading Dutch philosopher of science. Philosophers and scientists from all over the world, thirty seven in all, comment on Kuipers' philosophy, and each of their commentaries is followed by a reply from Kuipers. The present volume focuses on Kuipers' views on confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation, as laid down in his From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (Kluwer, 2000). In this book, Kuipers o…Read more
-
Ziekenfondsbrilletjes en de kromming in ruimte-tijd: Over wat wel en niet verbeeldbaar isAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 96 (1): 81-82. 2004.
-
17Confirmation, Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers (edited book)Rodopi. 2005.Theo AF Kuipers THE THREEFOLD EVALUATION OF THEORIES A SYNOPSIS OF FROM INSTRUMENTALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM. ON SOME RELATIONS BETWEEN CONFIRMATION, EMPIRICAL PROGRESS, AND TRUTH APPROXIMATION (2000) ABSTRACT.
-
212Reichenbach’s Posits RepositedErkenntnis 69 (1): 93-108. 2008.Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey co…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Formal Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Formal Epistemology |