Witold Marciszewski

This paper represents such an amateur approach; hence any comments backed up by professional erudition will be highly appreciated. Let me start from an attempt to sketch a relationship between professionals’ and amateurs’ contributions. The latter may be compared with the letters to the Editor of a journal, written by perceptive readers, while professionals contribute to the very content of the journal in question. Owing to such letters, the Editor and his professional staff can become more aware of the responses of educated public to the journal’s output

There seems to be something mysterious about applications of for- mal systems, including those of logic, to empirical reality 1 . If logic is to be applied to empirical situations, like those described in an ordinary lan- guage, then { it seems to some people { its statements cannot be necessary, or analytic, propositions. However, they are both applicable and necessary. This supposed puzzle constitutes a signicant part of the problem of philo- sophical foundations of logic 2 . To this mind of the present writer, there is no mystery of applications, since any empirical, or even ostensive, predicate can be involved in cer- tain meaning postulates, e.g. \No red is green", which are both empirical and necessary propositions; empirical as they involve ostensibly dened predicated; necessary, as it is enough to know their meaning to state, their validity. The case of logical theorems can be considered at the same footing, logical constants being treated as dened ostensively. Nevertheless, not an individual state of mind but the actual state of scholarly discussions makes something a problem; in the present state of foundational discussions on logic, the \mystery of applications" preserves its vitality, hence any new way of dealing with it proves welcome

Intelligent problem-solving depends on consciously applied methods of thinking as well as inborn or trained skills. The latter are like resident programs which control processes of the kind called (in Unix) daemons. Such a computational process is a fitting reaction to situations (defined in the program in question) which is executed without any command of a computer user (or without any intention of the conscious subject). The study of intelligence should involve methods of recognizing those beliefs whose existence is due to daemons. Once having been aware of so produced belief, one can assess it critically and, if possible and necessary, make it more rational. Eg, beliefs concerning properties of time are produced by a daemon-like intuition, likewise the Euclidean properties of space. The merit of getting aware of such daemon's activities, and so transforming implicit beliefs into explicit ones, lies mainly in the axiomatic characterization of the properties involved. That makes possible to improve a daemon-like conceptual equipment (producing beliefs) by suitable modifications of the axioms, or postulates. Such postulate sets can also define artificial daemons to either emulate or improve natural intelligence.