Manuel Gustavo Isaac

According to the folk conception of having evidence, if the butler killed the victim right in front of me, I have evidence that the butler killed the victim. According to the vast majority of experts in the nature of evidence, that’s only the case if I have the corresponding seemings and beliefs. Experts think the having relation is in the head. Laymen disagree. This paper argues that experts are wrong, and, furthermore, that the expert conception of the having relation is highly problematic functionally—in that it preempts evidence had from playing its roles in accountability, moral and legal. Experts should engineer their conception to fit the laymen’s.

Epistemology, for a large chunk of the twentieth century, was dominated by attempts to produce a conceptual analysis of knowledge. As everyone knows, it didn’t go too well. Gettier’s (1963) introduction of his eponymous counterexamples catalysed a flurry of attempts to pin down the elusive ‘missing ingredient’ that JTB apparently lacked. Yet to this day, despite reams of paper and gallons of ink spent, no solution has been found. Within the last quarter-century or so, there have been growing signs that the discipline has finally started to grow weary of the chase. Linda Zagzebski (1994), for instance, has argued that the Gettier problem is simply an inescapable consequence of fallibilism—that it cannot be ‘solved’. Fans of ‘knowledge first’ approaches (following Williamson, 2000) have, meanwhile, suggested that knowledge may simply be basic and unanalysable. Perhaps this looming sense of futility explains why epistemology’s primary focus has slowly started to shift away from the analysis of knowledge, to embrace a variety of more general epistemological topics such as epistemic value or the ethics of belief.

Conceptual engineering typically aims to fix some conceptual defects. Mona Simion, however, argues that it is permissible to engineer non-defective concepts too, but this mustn’t come with an epistemic loss. This paper holds that some conceptual resources should be fixed though because of serious ideological defects involved and it isn’t possible to engineer such concepts without an epistemic loss; still, this is the normative ground to engineer. In this spirit, Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky argues for an expanded version of Simion’s view to make engineering ideologically defective concepts permissible. Although Podosky’s critique of Simion is compelling, this paper critiques Podosky’s expanded version too: Podosky’s understanding of how ideological concepts work also generates prima facie prohibitions to engineer when engineering looks highly desirable. The paper thus proceeds to offer an alternative diagnosis of ideological defects. It subsequently raises another, less normative, issue about implementation: it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to merely ‘tweak’ ideological concepts. The discussion hence offers grounds to be skeptical about the feasibility of implementing new conceptual resources. It also urges modesty about how emancipatory ‘our’ attempts at conceptual innovation can be without this being enabled by alterations in background social conditions.

I argue that conceptual engineering, on the understanding I favour, is the identification and naming of the properties we need for this or that worthwhile purpose, independently of whether they are properties named in extant theories. So understood, it is obvious that conceptual engineering should be supported, and I give some non-controversial examples. I discuss the connection between our description of conceptual engineering in terms of properties and words, and the more usual one in terms of concepts. The implications of conceptual engineering for a number of live issues in analytical philosophy—knowledge, Swampman, narrow content, proper names—are discussed. I conclude by noting that our defence of conceptual engineering does not imply that traditional conceptual analysis has no worthwhile role to play but does imply that its role needs a certain amount of rethinking. I illustrate this with the example of personal identity.

In this paper I argue that the topic of epistemic justification offers promising terrain for conceptual engineering. For one thing, standards of epistemic justification themselves (and the concepts that capture them) aim to address certain practical and theoretical needs, and there is a clear rationale for engineering standards (concepts) to best suit these needs. In addition, neither of the two problems that plague conceptual engineering proposals in other domains—the implementation problem and the change-of-subject problem—seem particularly worrisome in connection with the proposal to engineer epistemological concepts. But the proof will be in the pudding, and in the second half of this paper I propose an engineered concept of epistemic justification. While the concept I characterize here is decidedly non-standard, I argue that it is the one we should use, in that it does a better job than rivals at addressing the needs to which a concept of epistemic justification should be responsive.

This paper makes a prima facie case for abandoning use of the terms ‘ideal theory’ and ‘non-ideal theory’ in social and political inquiry (across a central range of contexts). Our argument begins by observing two sorts of striking variation. The first is variation in how inquirers characterize “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory. The second is variation in the theoretical significance of idealization. Here, there is striking variation across theoretical contexts in the targets that can be usefully idealized, the degree of idealization that can be applied to those targets, and the ways that idealizations can be warranted or worrisome. Against the background of this variety, we argue both that central uses of these terms have the potential to obstruct inquiry, and that there is no theoretically appealing way to reform the existing usage.

Haslanger (Noûs 34(1):31–55, 2000) has argued that we should ameliorate concepts of race or gender to better capture existing structural inequalities. Her analysis was criticized by Simion (Inquiry 61(8):914–928, 2018a), who argued that a concept should be ameliorated only if doing so preserves epistemic accuracy. But, as I argue, this criticism misses Haslanger’s target. In response, Podosky (Inquiry 1–15, 2018) and McKenna (Logos Episteme 9(3):335–342, 2018) have argued that conceptual revisions need not preserve “epistemic accuracy” since concepts can “shape reality”, not just represent it. Here I argue that social kind concepts need not “shape” the corresponding social kinds: neither causally nor constitutively. This raises doubts about the function of ameliorative projects for social kind concepts as means to change social reality.

I begin, in Part I, with four general observations about engineering that have lessons for conceptual engineering. First, thoughtful engineering requires a design specification, a rough account of what the innovations in question are aimed at. Second, once we have the specification, we have to ask what’s necessary to achieve those aims. Third, there are usually many possible solutions, because (a) the aims are only vaguely specified and (b) there are all kinds of desiderata, each of which can be satisfied to a greater or lesser degree, and it’s both (c) unlikely that one solution is best with respect to all the constraints and (d) not clear how to rank them. Fourth, it can be very hard to predict how a proposed innovation might be taken up. This means that very often what’s needed is a trial-and-error process, in which proposals are made and we see what happens as they are and are not taken up.In Part II, I explore three observations we need to bear in mind when it is concepts, in particular, that are being engineered. First, we need to be clear what the aim is: in practice, it is to get people to use some word (old or new) in a particular way. Since what is involved is changing the behavior of large numbers of people in a coordinated way, what is going on is, in effect, a movement for social change. Also, second, because we are working on concepts, we need to be clear about some things about concepts: (a) they are best understood as embedded in theories, so that they come in clusters not one by one, and (b) most interesting concepts have very many conceptions, perhaps, at the finest grain, as many conceptions as users of a certain word. Third, the theories in question are going to be to some degree idealized. This means, I’ll argue, that truth isn’t all that matters.In Part III, I’ll explore some work in reshaping understandings of race in anglophone philosophy for the last half century, with these observations in mind.

Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are as cognitive devices and of what engineering is in the case of conceptual cognition. And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this programmatic paper is to overcome this knowledge gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theories of concepts and of engineering (viz. ‘cognitive engineering’) that are presumably needed so as to make conceptual engineering an actionable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices.

This book explores innovative applications of conceptual engineering to specific case studies beyond philosophy. Conceptual engineering is described a method for reframing philosophy as a problem-solving method of direct relevance for, and bearing on, areas of practical concern. Based on lectures at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020/2022 by leading philosophers, it opens new perspectives on a wide array of topics in relation to issues of high scientific, social, and political significance. This book is a must-read for professional philosophers, experts in metaphilosophy or those interested in applying the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization. It is also of great interest to philosophy students, eager to get acquainted with the most exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline.

This book develops novel connections between conceptual engineering and a variety of fields and methods in analytic philosophy. Conceptual engineering is an exciting new movement in contemporary analytic philosophy that focuses on assessing and improving our concepts. In less than a decade, it has successfully spanned across the whole discipline. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020/2022, this volume offers new perspectives on this wide array of topics and connects them to case studies of high philosophical, scientific, or social/political significance. This book is a must-read for professional philosophers, experts in metaphilosophy or those interested in applying the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization. It is also of great interest to philosophy students, eager to get acquainted with the most exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline.

Abstract‘Conceptual engineering’ is the new buzzword in the world of philosophical methods. Yet, on some accounts, it is hard to see what is distinctively new about it—if anything. This article tackles this hallmark problem for conceptual engineering. It starts by spelling out the requirements that result from using the engineering label through an analysis of its associated connotations. It next maps the logical space of available options to make sense of the engineering label in the context of conceptual engineering and evaluates each in turn for how it squares with these requirements. Having selected the most promising option with regard to said requirements, the article then reconstructs it by combining compatible extant accounts. Finally, it sketches on this basis a model of the engineering process for conceptual engineering as a staged and parametrized method for designing functionally improved representational devices. In this model, conceptual engineering becomes a radically novel philosophical method.

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual engineering—namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering.

This paper deals with Husserl’s idea of pure logic as it is coined in the Logical Investigations (1900/1901). First, it exposes the formation of pure logic around a conception of completeness (Sect. 2); then, it presents intentionality as the keystone of such a structuring (Sect. 3); and finally, it provides a systematic reconstruction of pure logic from the semiotic standpoint of intentionality (Sect. 4). In this way, it establishes Husserlian pure logic as a phenomenological epistemology of mathematical logic.

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise.

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations).

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this first of three volumes is dedicated to core foundational issues in conceptual engineering: questions about the nature and varieties of conceptual engineering, whether engineering a concept necessarily preserves core features of a concept, and where the normative limits of conceptual engineering lie. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel, Delia Belleri, Paul Egré & Cathal O’Madagain, Peter Gardener, Hans-Johan Glock, James Hampton, Allison Koslow, Esa Díaz León, and Sarah Sawyer.

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice.

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering.

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise.

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. Some have recently claimed that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative projects is truth-driven and should thus be epistemically constrained, ultimately at least (Simion 2018; cf. Podosky 2018). This paper challenges that claim on the assumption of a social constructionist analysis of ideologies, and provides an alternative, pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining the legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects overall. The upshot is that one should not ameliorate for the sake of truth or knowledge, in the case of ideologies—at least, not primarily.

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations).

Cet article a pour objet l’analyse de trois types de théorisations de la signification basées sur un modèle binaire du signe. Celles de Frege, Husserl et Saussure. Relevant d’un même paradigme, les deux premières sont confrontées en tant que s’y développent deux conceptions opposées de la signification – extensionnelle chez Frege, intensionnelle chez Husserl – contribuant à la mise en place, selon des perspectives opposées, de la dualisation de la syntaxe et de la sémantique. Relativement à cette conséquence, leur paradigme est ensuite opposé à celui de la sémiologie structurale de Saussure dans laquelle l’interaction de la syntaxe et de la sémantique est internalisée au niveau du système qu’intègrent les signes comme éléments. De sorte que ce que l’on vise au terme de cet article, c’est à mettre au jour une explication possible de la raison de la divergence entre deux types de conceptions de la sémantique qui organiseront le développement de courants concurrents tout au long de l’histoire de la linguistique du 20e siècle, l’une formelle et mathématisée, l’autre structurale.

Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are (as cognitive devices) and of what engineering is (in the case of cognition). And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this programmatic paper is to overcome this knowledge gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theories of concepts and of cognition that will ground the systematic unified framework needed to effectively implement conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices.

Intentionality may be dealt with in two different ways: either ontologically, as an ordinary relation to some extraordinary objects, or epistemologically, as an extraordinary relation to some ordinary objects. This paper endorses the epistemological view in order to provide a model of semiotic intentionality defined as the meaning-and-cognizing process that constitutes to power of the mind to be about something on the basis of a semiotic system. After a short introduction that presents the components of semiotic intentionality (viz. sign, act, content, referent) along with their division into an intending and a fulfilling side (Sect. 1), the first main part of the paper analyzes semiotic intentionality at its primary level (a.k.a. 'concrete intentionality') as a real and subjective relation between meaning-intending and meaning-fulfilling acts grounded in the manipulation of some semiotic system (Sect. 2). Then, building on such concrete intentionality, the second main part of the paper analyzes semiotic intentionality at its secondary level (a.k.a. 'abstract intentionality') as an ideal and objective relation between intentional and fulfillment contents, which in turn: (i) proceed from an abstraction performed on the intending and fulfilling acts, respectively, and (ii) retroactively categorize the intending and fulfilling acts, respectively (Sect. 3). Finally, from this combination of an act-based conception of content with a presentationalist account of intentionality, the conclusion of this paper produces the intended model of semiotic intentionality in such a way that knowledge and truth are then respectively defined in it as the subjective correspondence between the two acts of concrete intentionality and as the objective correspondence between the two contents of abstract intentionality (Sect. 4).