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Ryan Muldoon

University at Buffalo
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    35
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    • Topics
  •  Events
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  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • University at Buffalo
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
University of Pennsylvania
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Homepage
Buffalo, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Social Science
Social Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Social Science
General Philosophy of Science
Formal Social Epistemology
Social Epistemology
3 more
  • All publications (35)
  •  271
    Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not
    with Cristina Bicchieri and Erte Xiao
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2): 170-187. 2011.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitu…Read more
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.
    Moral Reasoning and MotivationExperimental EconomicsValues in EconomicsRationality in EconomicsEcono…Read more
    Moral Reasoning and MotivationExperimental EconomicsValues in EconomicsRationality in EconomicsEconomic InstitutionsSocial and Political Philosophy, MiscellaneousMoral NaturalismGame TheoryPolitical TheoryTrust
  •  194
    Segregation That No One Seeks
    with Tony Smith and Michael Weisberg
    Philosophy of Science 79 (1): 38-62. 2012.
    This paper examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demon- strate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this, and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states amongst agents of the same type. This is quite dierent from Schelling-like behavior, and sug- gests (in …Read more
    This paper examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demon- strate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this, and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states amongst agents of the same type. This is quite dierent from Schelling-like behavior, and sug- gests (in his terms) that segregation is an instance of macro behavior which can arise from a wide variety of micro motives.
    The Nature of ModelsPhilosophy of Economics, Misc
  •  70
    Decision-making made simple: Paul Weirich: Models of decision-making: simplifying choices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 276 pp, $95.00 HB
    Metascience 25 (2): 327-329. 2016.
  •  358
    On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms
    with Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann, and Jan Sprenger
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1): 3-22. 2014.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms
    Social and Political PhilosophyTheory in EconomicsConvention and CoordinationGame Theory and EthicsI…Read more
    Social and Political PhilosophyTheory in EconomicsConvention and CoordinationGame Theory and EthicsInvisible Hand Explanations
  •  109
    Introduction, SI of Synthese “The collective dimension of science”
    with Cyrille Imbert, Jan Sprenger, and Kevin Zollman
    Synthese 191 (1): 1-2. 2014.
    Collective Epistemology
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