Michael R. Kelly

This book explores the problem of time and immanence for phenomenology in the work of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida. Detailed readings of immanence in light of the more familiar problems of time-consciousness and temporality provide the framework for evaluating both Husserl's efforts to break free of modern philosophy's notions of immanence, and the influence Heidegger's criticism of Husserl exercised over Merleau-Ponty's and Derrida's alternatives to Husserl's phenomenology. Ultimately exploring various notions of intentionality, these in-depth analyses of immanence and temporality suggest a new perspective on themes central to phenomenology's development as a movement and raise for debate the question of where phenomenology begins and ends.

For all its subtle differences, Husserl scholarship on time-consciousness has reached a consensus that Husserl’s theory underwent a significant interpretiveimprovement starting around 1908 / 1909. On this advance, which concerned the intentional structure and directedness of absolute consciousness, I have cautioned against reading Augustine’s theory of time as a philosophical predecessor to Husserl’s. In a recent “confrontation” with my efforts, Roger Wasserman tried to defend a reading of Augustine’s influence on Husserl’s theory of time by criticizing my reading of Augustine and Husserl. This reply to Wasserman’s challenge (i) reestablishes my reservations about attempts to claim a relation between Augustine and Husserl on time-consciousness, (ii) defends the standard interpretation of the development of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness, and (iii) raises several critical questions about Wasserman’s Neoplatonic or Augustinian reading of Husserl on time-consciousness.