Laura Purdy

The Religious RightReligious right is using every means to impose its restrictive view of sexual and reproductive rights on everyone under the umbrella of a so-called culture of life (CL). The CL prohibits the direct killing of innocents (but not, apparently, letting them die), and requires that all sexual activity be open to procreation, thus restricting access to abortionAbortion and contraception. All this is alleged to be based on God’s will and to constitute the only objective moralityMorality. But there is no epistemological basis for this claim, the strictures are inconsistent, and the rules create unnecessary misery. Those most at risk from the sexual strictures are women, children, and gay men. The risks are greatly magnified in Third World countries because of povertyPovertyand lack of accessHealth/ healthcare, right toaccess to even the most basic health care. Yet the Bush administration is doing everything in its power to impose the CL on such countries by means of its foreign policyForeign policy and aid programs.

Pronatalism—the social bias toward having children—is at the core of much violence against women. Its chief characteristic, and its moral Achilles heel, is that it undermines autonomous decision-making about childbearing. Together with its soulmates misogyny and geneticism, it harms children, male partners, and humanity as a whole, given the serious environmental challenges now facing us. But, of course, biology requires women to gestate offspring, and women are generally expected to be responsible for childrearing. Female gender roles incorporate these facts, and thus pronatalism’s negative impact on women—both their bodies and their lives—is of another order of magnitude. Yet, this state of affairs is so taken for granted that it is almost invisible, and is therefore especially hard to eradicate. Attempts to do so are also often erroneously confused with, and undermined by, negativism about having children.

In Neutrality and the Academic Ethic, distinguished philosopher Robert L. Simon explores the claim that universities can and should be politically neutral. He examines conceptual questions about the meaning of neutrality, distinguishes different conceptions of what neutrality involves, and considers in what sense, if any, institutional neutrality is both possible and desirable. In Part II, a collection of original and previously published essays provides different views on these and related issues

This article is an expansion of comments I was honored to present at a celebration of the life and work of Anne Donchin at the June 2016 meeting of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics in Edinburgh. It is obviously far from comprehensive, but I hope it gives readers a glimpse of an Anne of whose depths many of us were not fully aware. One of the most difficult parts of talking about someone who has died is highlighting the positive without overdoing it to the extent that their friends and loved ones find themselves rolling their mental eyes a bit, since most of us—no matter how wonderful—are a little less than perfect. But my problem here is that the more I have found out...

New and proposed medical technologies continually challenge our vision of what constitutes appropriate medical treatment. As scholars and consumers grapple with the meaning of innovation, one common critical theme to surface is that it constitutes undesirable medicalization. But we are embodied creatures who can often benefit from medical knowledge; in addition, rejection of medicalization may be in some cases based on an untenable appeal to nature. Harnessing the power of medicine for women’s welfare requires us to rethink the goals of medicine as well as implement fundamental reforms.