•  179
    Fundamental Rights and the Right to Bear Arms
    Criminal Justice Ethics 20 (1): 25-27. 2001.
    This paper discusses the views of Wheeler and LaFollette on the right to bear arms. It argues, with LaFollette and against Wheeler that the right to bear arms is derivative and not a fundamental right. My argument pivots on the idea that Wheeler's account of what makes a right fundamental is too broad.
  •  2546
    The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: A Critique of Kant on Self-Respect
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1): 65-82. 1997.
    Kant claims that persons have a perfect duty to respect themselves. I argue, first, that Kant’s argument for the duty of self-respect commits him to an implausible view of the nature of self-respect: he must hold that failures of self-respect are either deliberate or matter of self-deception. I argue, second, that this problem cannot be solved by understanding failures of self-respect as failures of rationality because such a view is incompatible with human psychology. Surely it is not irratio…Read more
  •  3283
    Hypothetical Consent and Justification
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (6): 313. 2000.
    Hypothetical contracts have been said to be not worth the paper they are not written on. This paper defends hypothetical consent theories of justice, such as Rawls's, against the view that they lack justificatory power. I argue that while hypothetical consent cannot generate political obligation, it can generate political legitimacy.