Pam R. Sailors

In this paper, we examine the case of Ronda Rousey, a high profile female Mixed Martial Arts fighter in the Ultimate Fighting Championship. We argue that Rousey represents a female athlete who can be considered a gender transgressor yet simultaneously a Glamazon. The case of Rousey will be applied to gender transgressor theories to demonstrate that Rousey counters traditional discourse which holds that exhibiting stereotypically masculine traits implies not being an authentic woman. Female fighters face criticisms for being “unfeminine” or “manly” because they participate in such an aggressive sport. Despite her gender divergent behaviour, as much as she transgresses, Rousey is also pinned by sporting and societal sexist culture that reinforces sex binaries and exposes pressures to adhere to hyperfemininity and heterosexual ideals. Finally, using the notions of self and power found in Michel Foucault’s later work as a springboard, we examine whether Rousey’s embrace of the Glamazon identity is an act of autonomy or evidence of false consciousness.

Medical ethics has traditionally been governed by two guiding, but sometimes conflicting, principlesthe Substituted Judgment Standard shows our concern for autonomy, whereas the Best Interest Standard shows our commitment to benevolence. Both standards are vulnerable to criticisms. Further, the principles can seem to offer conflicting prescriptions for action. The criticisms and conflict figure prominently in discussion of advance directive decisionmaking and Alzheimer's disease. After laying out each of the current standards and its problems, with Alzheimer's issues as my central concern, I offer a new standard that avoids the problems while honoring our concerns for both autonomy and benevolence

A survey of the philosophy of sport literature reveals that arguments regarding the issue of sex segregation in athletics have been advanced from time to time, but there has been little sustained discussion, no consensus, and no change in existing practice. In this paper, an effort to advance the conversation, I begin with Jane English’s seminal 1978 article as a springboard and employ existing literature on the question of sex segregation in order to raise difficulties with English’s analysis and outline the basic alternative positions that have been taken on the issue. My own contribution to the conversation is in the introduction of four distinctions – between individual and team sports, direct and indirect competition, contact and non-contact sports, and amateur and professional sports – that have not been part of the discussion about the conditions under which men and women might compete against one another. These distinctions resolve several difficulties noted by others and suggest a more nuanced conclusion about desirable changes to the structure of sporting competition